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Chapter 1: Introduction
Since the revolutionary technique of generative adversarial networks (GANs) [9]
was invented seven years ago, its successive breakthroughs have demonstrated stunning
performance in generating photorealistic images [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. The
progress is mainly driven by large-scale datasets [16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22], architectural
tuning [16, 17, 23, 24], and loss designs [12, 13, 25, 26, 27, 28]. GAN techniques have
been popularized into extensive computer vision applications, including but not limited
to image translation [22, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36], postprocessing [37, 38, 39,
40, 41, 42, 43], image manipulation [44, 45, 46, 47], texture synthesis [48, 49], image
inpainting [5, 50, 51, 52], and text-to-image generation [53, 54, 55, 56]. The recent Adobe
Neural Filter library1 pioneers the commercialization of GANs.
We regard these as the blessing of GANs. Yet generated images are still easy to
spot especially on datasets with high variance (e.g. bedroom, church). Therefore, in
Chapter 2 we propose various improvements to further push the boundaries in image
generation. Specifically, we propose a novel dual contrastive loss and show that, with
this loss, discriminator learns more generalized and distinguishable representations to
incentivize generation. In addition, we revisit attention and extensively experiment with
1https://helpx.adobe.com/photoshop/using/neural-filters.html
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different attention blocks in the generator. We find attention to be still an important
module for successful image generation even though it was not used in the recent state-of-
the-art models. Lastly, we study different attention architectures in the discriminator, and
propose a reference attention mechanism. By combining the strengths of these remedies,
we improve the compelling state-of-the-art Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) by at least
17.5% on several benchmark datasets. We obtain even more significant improvements on
compositional synthetic scenes (up to 47.5% in FID).
With the improvement of GAN performance witnessed, we specify in Chapter 3
its steerability in Texture Mixer, a controllable texture interpolation pipeline. This study
addresses the problem of interpolating visual textures. We formulate this problem by
requiring (1) by-example controllability and (2) realistic and smooth interpolation among
an arbitrary number of texture samples. To solve it we propose a neural network trained
simultaneously on a reconstruction task and a generative adversarial task, which can
project texture examples onto a latent space where they can be linearly interpolated and
projected back onto the image domain, thus ensuring both intuitive control and realistic
results. We show our method outperforms several baselines according to a comprehensive
suite of metrics as well as a user study. We further show several applications based on
our technique, which include texture brush, texture dissolve, and animal hybridization.
Demos, videos, code, data, models, and supplemental material are available at GitHub2.
However, a coin has two sides. Despite plenty of use cases of the GAN technique, a
flood of strong concerns arise from its curse. Given the level of realism and diversity that
GANs can achieve today, detecting generated media, well known as deepfakes, attributing
2https://github.com/ningyu1991/TextureMixer.git
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their sources, and tracing their legal responsibilities become infeasible to human beings.
Moreover, the misuse of deepfakes has been permeating to each corner of social media,
ranging from misinformation of political campaigns3 to fake journalism4 5. Therefore, it
is critical to look into effective visual forensics against threats from GANs. As responses,
we propose a series of GAN fingerprinting solutions that enable the detection and attribution
of GAN-generated image misuse.
In Chapter 4, We present the first study of learning GAN fingerprints towards
image attribution and using them to classify an image as real or GAN-generated. For
GAN-generated images, we further identify their sources. Our experiments show that (1)
GANs carry distinct model fingerprints and leave stable fingerprints in their generated
images, which support image attribution; (2) even minor differences in GAN training
can result in different fingerprints, which enables fine-grained model authentication; (3)
fingerprints persist across different image frequencies and patches and are not biased by
GAN artifacts; (4) fingerprint finetuning is effective in immunizing against five types of
adversarial image perturbations; and (5) comparisons also show our learned fingerprints
consistently outperform several baselines in a variety of setups. Code, data, models, and
supplementary material are available at GitHub6.
While the above work on deepfake detection demonstrates high accuracy, it is
subject to advances in generation techniques and adversarial iterations on detection countermeasure







detection, that is agnostic to the evolution of generative models, by introducing artificial
fingerprints into the models. Our approach is simple and effective. We first embed
artificial fingerprints into training data, then validate a surprising discovery on the transferability
of such fingerprints from training data to generative models, which in turn appears in
the generated deepfakes. Experiments show that our fingerprinting solution (1) holds
for a variety of cutting-edge generative models, (2) leads to a negligible side effect on
generation quality, (3) stays robust against image-level and model-level perturbations,
(4) stays hard to be detected by adversaries, and (5) converts deepfake detection and
attribution into trivial tasks and outperforms the recent state-of-the-art baselines. Our
solution closes the responsibility loop between publishing pre-trained generative model
inventions and their possible misuses, which makes it independent of the current arms
race.
In addition, we propose to improve the efficiency and scalability of proactive GAN
fingerprinting in Chapter 6. Our technique achieves this by ad-hoc generating a large
population of models with distinct fingerprints. Our recommended operation point uses
a 128-bit fingerprint which in principle results in more than 1036 identifiable models.
Experiments show that our method fulfills key properties of a fingerprinting mechanism
and achieves effectiveness in deep fake detection and attribution. As a result, our work
enables a responsible disclosure of state-of-the-art generative models, that allows researchers
and companies to fingerprint their models, so that the generated samples containing a
fingerprint can be accurately detected and attributed to a source.
Another thread of concerns on the curse of GANs comes from the fact that there
could be potential biases in the learned model against underrepresented data subgroups [57,
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58, 59, 60, 61]. The biases are rooted in the inevitable imbalance in the dataset [62], which
are even exacerbated by the GANs [58]. This is because GANs can implicitly disregard
infrequent images due to the well-established problem of mode collapse [63, 64], thereby
further introducing model biases on top of data biases. This issue is particularly acute
from the perspective of minority inclusion, because training data associated with minority
subgroups by definition do not form dominant modes. Consequently, data from minority
groups are rare to begin with, and would not be capable of being produced by the generative
model at all due to mode collapse.
As a response, in Chapter 7 we propose Inclusive GAN, the first study to formalize
the problem of minority inclusion in GANs as one of data coverage, and then propose to
improve data coverage by harmonizing adversarial training with reconstructive generation.
The experiments show that our method outperforms the existing state-of-the-art methods
in terms of data coverage on both seen and unseen data. We develop an extension
that allows explicit control over the minority subgroups that the model should ensure to
include, and validate its effectiveness at little compromise from the overall performance
on the entire dataset. Code, models, and supplemental videos are available at GitHub7.
7https://github.com/ningyu1991/InclusiveGAN.git
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Chapter 2: Dual Contrastive Loss and Attention for GANs
2.1 Introduction
Photorealistic image generation has increasingly become reality, benefiting from the
invention of generative adversarial networks (GANs) [9] and its successive breakthroughs [10,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 65, 66]. The progress is mainly driven by large-scale datasets [16, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22], architectural tuning [16, 17, 23, 24, 67], and loss designs [13, 25, 26,
27, 28, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71]. GAN techniques have been popularized into extensive
computer vision applications, including but not limited to image translation [22, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36], postprocessing [37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43], image manipulation [44,
45, 46, 47], texture synthesis [48, 49, 72], image inpainting [5, 50, 51, 52], and text-to-
image generation [53, 54, 55, 56].
Yet, behind the seemingly saturated performance of the state-of-the-art StyleGAN2 [17],
there still persists open issues of GANs that make generated images surprisingly obvious
to spot [1, 73, 74]. Hence, it is still necessary to revisit the fundamental generation power
when other concurrent deep learning techniques keep advancing and creating space for
GAN improvements.
We investigate methods to improve GANs in two dimensions. In the first dimension,




































Figure 2.1: The diagram of our GAN framework using three key components: self-
attention in the generator, reference-attention in the discriminator, and a novel dual
contrastive loss. Technical diagrams are in Fig. 2.2 and 2.4.
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data distribution via a workaround of real/fake binary classification, a more effective
discriminator can back-propagate more meaningful signals for the generator to compete
against. However, the feature representations of discriminators are often not generalized
enough to incentivize the adversarially evolving generator and are prone to forgetting
previous tasks [75] or previous data modes [63, 64]. This often leads to the generated
samples with discontinued semantic structures [23, 76] or the generated distribution with
mode collapse [28, 63]. To mitigate this issue, we propose to synergize generative modeling
with the advancements in contrastive learning [77, 78]. In this direction, for the first time,
we replace the logistic loss of StyleGAN2 with a newly designed dual contrastive loss.
In the second dimension, we revisit the architecture of both generator and discriminator
networks. Specifically, many GAN-based image generators rely on convolutional layers
to encode features. In such design, long-range dependencies across pixels (e.g., large-size
semantically correlated layouts) can only be formulated with a deep stack of convolutional
layers. This, however, does not favor the stability of GAN training because of the challenge
to coordinate multiple layers desirably. The minimax formulation and the alternating
gradient ascent-descent in the GAN framework further exacerbate such instability. To
circumvent this issue, attention mechanisms that support long-range modeling across
image regions are incorporated into GAN models [14, 23]. After that, however, StyleGAN2
claimed the state of the art with a novel architectural design without any attention mechanisms.
Therefore, it turns not clear whether attention still improves results, which of the popular
attention mechanisms [4, 79, 80, 81] improves the most, and in return of how many
additional parameters. To answer these questions, we extensively study the role of attention
in the current state-of-the-art generator, and during this study improve the results significantly.
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In the discriminator, we again explore the role of attention as shown in Fig. 7.1. We
design a novel reference attention mechanism in the discriminator where we allow two
irrelevant images as the inputs at the same time: one input is sampled from real data as a
reference, and the other input is switched between a real sample and a generated sample.
The two inputs are encoded through two Siamese branches [82, 83, 84, 85] and fused by a
reference-attention module. In this way, we achieve to guide real/fake classification under
the attention of the real world. Contributions are summarized as follow:
• We propose a novel dual contrastive loss in adversarial training that generalizes
representation to more effectively distinguish between real and fake, and further
incentivize the image generation quality.
• We investigate variants of the attention mechanism in GAN architecture to mitigate
the local and stationary issues of convolutions.
• We design a novel reference-attention discriminator architecture that substantially
benefits limited-scale datasets.
• We conduct extensive experiments on large-scale datasets and their smaller subsets.
We show that our improvements on the loss function and on the generator hold in
both scenarios. On the other hand, we find discriminator to behave differently based
on the number of available images, and the reference-attention-based discriminator
to be only improving on limited-scale datasets.
• We redefine the state of the art by improving FID scores by at least 17.5% on several
large-scale benchmark datasets. We also achieve more realistic generation on the
CLEVR dataset [21] which poses different challenges from the other datasets: compositional
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scenes with occlusions, shadows, reflections, and mirror surfaces. It comes with
47.5% FID improvement.
2.2 Related work
Generative adversarial networks (GANs). Since the invention of GANs [9],
there have been rapid progress to achieve photorealistic image generation [10, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 65, 66, 66]. Significant improvements are obtained by careful architectural
designs for generators [16, 17, 23, 24, 67], discriminators [33, 86] and new regularization
techniques [13, 25, 26, 27, 28, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71]. Architectural evolution in generators
started from a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) [9] and moved to deep convolutional neural
networks (DCNN) [10], to models with residual blocks [13], and recently style-based [16,
17] and attention-based [14, 23] models. Similarly, discriminators evolved from MLP to
DCNN [10], however, their design has not been studied as aggressively. In this paper, we
propose changes in both generators and discriminators, and for the loss function.
Contrastive learning. Contrastive learning targets a transformation of inputs into
an embedding where associated signals are brought together, and they are distanced from
the other samples in the dataset [78, 87, 88, 89]. The same intuition behind contrastive
learning has also been the base of Siamese networks [82, 83, 84, 85]. Contrastive learning
is shown to be an effective tool for unsupervised learning [77, 90, 91], conditional image
synthesis [36, 69, 70], and domain adaptation [92]. In this work, we study its effectiveness
when it is closely coupled with the adversarial training framework and replaces the conventional
adversarial loss for unconditional image generation. It is orthogonal to the works [69, 70,
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71] where the contrastive losses serve only as an incremental auxiliary to the conventional
adversarial loss and require expensive class annotations or augmentation for generation.
Attention models. Attention models have dominated the language modeling [93,
94, 95, 96, 97], and became popular among various computer vision problems from image
recognition [80, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104] to image captioning [105, 106, 107] to
video prediction [79, 81]. They are proposed in various forms: spatial attention that
reweights the convolution activations [23, 81, 108], in different channels [99, 100, 101],
or a combination of them [107, 109, 110]. Attention models with their reweighting
mechanisms provide a possibility for long-range modeling across distant image regions.
As attention models outperform others in various computer vision tasks, researchers
were quick to incorporate them into unconditional image generation [14, 23, 67, 111],
semantic-based image generation [86, 112], and text-guided image manipulation models [113,
114]. Even though attention models have already benefited the image generation tasks,
we believe the results can be further improved by empowering the state-of-the-art image
synthesis models [17] (attention not involved) with the most recent achievements in the
attention modules [4]. In addition, we design a novel reference-attention architecture for
the discriminator and show a further boost on limited-scale datasets.
2.3 Approach
Our improvements for GANs include a novel dual contrastive loss and variants of
the attention mechanisms. For each improvement, we organize the context in a combination
between method formulation and experimental investigation. After validating our optimal
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Figure 2.2: Comparisons between the diagram of conventional GAN loss and diagram of
our dual contrastive loss. Our contrastive loss in Case I aims at teaching the discriminator
to disassociate a single real image (R) against a batch of generated images (F). Dually in
Case II, the discriminator learns to disassociate a single generated image against a batch
of real images.
configuration, we compare it to the state of the art in Section 5.5.
2.3.1 Dual contrastive loss
Adversarial training relies on the discriminator’s ability on real vs. fake classification.
As in other classification tasks, discriminators are also prone to overfitting when the
dataset size is limited [115]. On larger datasets, on the other hand, there is no study
showing that disciminators overfit but we hypothesize that adversarial training can still
benefit from novel loss functions which encourage the distinguishability power of the
discriminator representations for their real vs. fake classification task.
We put another lens on the representation power of the discriminator by incentivizing
generation via contrastive learning. Contrastive learning associates data points and their
positive examples and disassociates the other points within the dataset which are referred
to as negative examples. It is recently re-popularized by various unsupervised learning
works [77, 78, 87, 88, 89] and generation works [36, 69, 70]. Among these works,
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contrastive learning is used as an auxiliary task. For example in image to image translation
task, a translator learns to output a zebra image given a horse image via adversarial loss
and in addition learns to align the input horse image and the generated zebra image
via contrastive loss function [36]. Contrastive loss in that work is utilized such that
given a patch showing the legs of an output zebra should be strongly associated with the
corresponding legs of the input horse, more so than the other patches randomly extracted
from the horse image.
In this work, different from the previous ones, we do not use contrastive learning
as an auxiliary task but directly couple it in the main adversarial training by a novel
loss function formulation. We, to the best of our knowledge, for the first time train an
unconditional GAN by solely relying on contrastive learning. As shown in Fig. 2.2 Right
Case I, our contrastive loss function aims at teaching the discriminator to disassociate a
single real image against a batch of generated images. Dually in Case II, the discriminator
learns to disassociate a single generated image against a batch of real images. The
generator adversarially learns to minimize such dual contrasts. Mathematically, we derive
this loss function by extending the binary classification used in [9, 17] to a noise contrastive
estimation framework [77], a one-against-a-batch classification in the softmax cross-
entropy formulation. The novel formulation is as follows:
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In Case I:



















































Comparing between Eq. 2.1 and 2.2, the duality is formulated by switching the
order of real/fake sampling while keeping the other calculation unchanged. Comparing to
the logistic loss [9, 17], contrastive loss enriches the softplus formulation log(1 + eD(·))
with a batch of inner terms and using discriminator logit contrasts between real and fake





Lcontrreal (G,D) + L
contr
fake (G,D) (2.3)
Investigation on loss designs. We extensively validate the effectiveness of dual
contrastive loss compared to other loss functions as presented in Table 2.1. We replace the
loss used in StyleGAN2 [17], non-saturating default loss, with other popular GAN losses
while keeping all the other parameters the same. As shown in Table 2.1, dual contrastive
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FFHQ Bedroom Church Horse CLEVR
Non-saturating [9] (default) 4.86 4.01 4.54 3.91 9.62
Saturating [9] 5.16 4.26 4.80 5.90 10.46
Wasserstein [66] 7.99 6.05 6.28 7.23 5.82
Hinge [116] 4.14 4.92 4.39 5.27 14.87
Dual contrastive (ours) 3.98 3.86 3.73 3.70 6.06
Table 2.1: Comparisons in FID among different GAN losses. Based on StyleGAN2 config
E backbone, it shows our contrastive loss outperforms a variety of other losses on four
out of five large-scale datasets. Wasserstein loss is better than ours on CLEVR, but are
the worst on the other datasets.
Loss FFHQ Bedroom Church Horse CLEVR
Non-saturating [9] (default) 245. 332. 517. 1285. 199.
Dual contrastive (ours) 377. 580. 856. 1645. 513.
Table 2.2: Comparisons in FDDF between StyleGAN2 default loss and our loss. A
larger value is more desirable, indicating the learned discriminator features are more
distinguishable between real and fake.
loss is the only loss that significantly improves upon the default loss of StyleGAN2
consistently on all the five datasets. Wasserstein loss is better than ours on CLEVR
dataset, but is the worst among all the loss functions on the other datasets. We reason the
success of the dual loss to its formulation that explicitly learns an unbiased representation
between real and generated distributions.
The distinguishability of contrastive representation. Motivated by the consistent
improvement from our dual contrastive loss, we delve deeper to investigate if and by how
much our contrastive representation is more distinguishable than the original discriminator
representation. We measure the representation distinguishability by the Fréchet distance
of the discriminator features in the last layer (FDDF) between 50K real and generated
samples. A larger value indicates more distinguishable features between real and fake.
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Figure 2.3: The tSNE plots for the distributions of discriminator features. The
distinguishability of features based on our contrastive loss is much more significant than
that based on the default non-saturating loss in StyleGAN2 baseline. Our loss learns to
associate fake features to a “core” clique (green) while pushing real features in the wild
outwards as “satellites” (black). The baseline loss fails to differentiate features from the
two sources (red v.s. blue) with a clear margin.
We find our dual contrastive features to be consistently more distinguishable than the
original discriminator features as shown in Table 2.2 and Fig. 2.3, which back-propagates
more effective gradients to incentivize our generator.
2.3.2 Self-attention in the generator
The majority of the GAN-based image generators rely solely on convolutional
layers to extract features [10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 65, 66], even though the local and stationary
convolution primitive in the generator can not model the long-range dependencies in an
image. Among recent GAN-based models, SAGAN [23] uses the self-attention block [81]
and demonstrates improved results. BigGAN [14] also follows this choice and uses a
similar attention module for better performance. After that, however, StyleGAN [16] and
StyleGAN2 [17] redefine the state of the art with various modifications in the generator
16
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Figure 2.4: The diagram of self-attention and reference-attention schemes. The attention
module is instantiated by SAN [4] but is agnostic to network backbone. It can flexibly
switch to other options and be plug-and-play. We switch between the sources that are used
to calculate the Key and Query tensors, so as to implement self-attention and reference-
attention respectively.
architecture which do not include any attention mechanisms. StyleGAN2 also shows
that generation results can be improved by larger networks with an increased number
of convolution filters. Therefore, it is now not clear what the role of attention is in
the state-of-the-art image generation models. Does attention still improve the network
performance? Which attention mechanism benefits the most and in the trade of how
many additional parameters? To answer these questions, we experiment with previously
proposed self-attention modules: Dynamic Filter Networks (DFN) [79], Visual Transformers
(VT) [80], Self-Attention GANs (SAGAN) [23], as well as the state-of-the-art patch-
based spatially-adaptive self-attention module, SAN [4].
All the above self-attention modules are benefited from their adaptive data-dependent
parameter space while they have their own hand-crafted architecture designs and interpretability.
DFN [79] keeps the convolution primitive but makes the convolutional filter condition to
its input tensor. VT [80] compresses input tensor to a set of 1D feature vectors, interprets
them as semantic tokens, and leverages language transformer [93] for tensor propagation.
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SAN [4] generalizes the self-attention block [81] (as used in SAGAN [23]) by replacing
the point-wise softmax attention with a patch-wise fully-connected transformation.
We show the diagram of self-attention in Figure 2.4, with a specific instantiation
from SAN [4] due to its generalized and state-of-the-art design. Note that the attention
module is agnostic to network backbone and can be switched to other options for fair
comparisons. For conceptual and technical completeness, we formulate our SAN-based
self-attention below.
In details, let T ∈ Rh×w×c be the input tensor to a convolutional layer in the original
architecture. Following the mainstream protocol of self-attention calculation [23, 81,
111], we obtain the corresponding key, query, and value tensors K(T),Q(T),V(T) ∈
Rh×w×c separately using 1 × 1 convolutional kernel followed by bias and leaky ReLU.
For each location (i, j) within the tensor spatial dimensions, we extract a large patch with
size s from K centered at (i, j), denoted as k ∈ Rs×s×c. We then flatten the patch and
concatenate it along the channel dimension with q ∈ R1×1×c, the query vector at (i, j), to
obtain p ∈ R1×1×(s2c+c):










p = concat (flatten(k),q)
(2.4)
In order to cooperate between the key and query, we feed p through two fully-
connected layers followed by bias and leaky ReLU and obtain a vector with size w̃ ∈
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R1×1×s2c:
ŵ = leakyReLU(pMw1 + bw1)
w̃ = ŵMw2 + bw2
(2.5)
Mw1 ∈ R(s2c+c)×s2c, Mw2 ∈ Rs2c×s2c, and bw1,bw2 ∈ R1×1×s2c are the learnable
parameters in the fully connected layers and biases.
On one hand we reshape w̃ back to the patch size w ∈ Rs×s×c; on the other hand
we extract a patch with the same size from V centered at (i, j), denoted as v ∈ Rs×s×c.
Next, we aggregate v over spatial dimensions with the correponding weights from w to
derive an output vector o ∈ R1×1×c:
w = reshape(w̃)














We loop over all the (i, j) to constitute an output tensor Ōself ∈ Rh×w×c and define
it as the self-attention output. Finally, we replace the original convolution output with
Oself ∈ Rh×w×c, a residual version of this self-attention output.




Oself = Ōself + T
(2.7)
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CelebA Animal Face Bedroom Church
StyleGAN2 [17] 9.84 36.55 19.33 11.02
+ DFN [79] 8.41 35.10 26.86 11.31
+ VT [80] 9.18 34.70 16.85 10.64
+ SAGAN [23] 9.35 34.83 17.94 10.65
+ SAN [4] 8.60 32.72 16.36 9.62
Table 2.3: Comparisons in FID among different attention modules in the generator.
StyleGAN2 config E which does not include an attention module is used as a backbone.
For computationally efficient comparisons, we use the 30k subset of each dataset at
128×128 resolution.
Figure 2.5: StyleGAN2 + SAN generated samples and their self-attention maps in the
generator for the corresponding dot positions. Considering there is an attention weight
kernel w ∈ Rs×s×c for each position, we visualize the norm for each spatial position of w.
The attention maps strongly align to the semantic layout and structures of the generated
images, which enable long-range dependencies across objects.
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It is worth noting that w plays a conceptually equivalent role as the softmax attention
map of the traditional key-query aggregation [23, 81, 111], except it is not identical across
channels anymore but rather generalized to optimize for each channel. w also aligns in
spirit with the concept of DFN [79], except the spatial size s×s is empirically set much
larger than 3×3, and more importantly, w is not “sliding” anymore but rather generalized
to optimize at each location.
Investigations on self-attention modules. In Table 2.3 we extensively compare
among a variety of self-attention modules by replacing the default convolution in the
32×32-resolution layer in StyleGAN2 [17] config E backbone with one of them. We
justify that SAN [4] significantly improves over the StyleGAN2 baseline and consistently
improves for various datasets outperforming other attention variants with a clear margin.
We visualize the attention map examples of the best performing generator (StyleGAN2
+ SAN) in Fig. 2.5. We find attention maps to strongly correspond to the semantic layout
and structures of the generated images.
Complexity of self-attention modules. We also compare in Table 2.4 the time
and space complexity of these self-attention modules. We observe that DFN [79] and
VT [80] moderately improve the generation quality yet in the trade of undesirable> 3.6×
complexity. On the contrary, the improvements from SAGAN [23] or SAN [4] are not at
the cost of complexity, but rather benefited from the more representative attention designs.
They use a fewer number of convolution channels and the multi-head trick [81] to control
their complexity. These results show that the improved performance does not come from
any additional parameters but rather the attention structure itself.
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Method FLOPS (G) #parameters (M)
StyleGAN2 [17] 1.08 48.77
+ DFN [79] 4.20 177.60
+ VT [80] 7.39 240.09
+ SAGAN [23] 0.99 44.99
+ SAN [4] 1.08 48.43
Table 2.4: Time complexity in FLOPS and space complexity in the number of parameters
for each method.
2.3.3 Reference-attention in the discriminator
First, we apply SAN [4], the best attention mechanism we validated in the generator,
to the discriminator. However, we do not see a benefit of such design as shown in Table
2.5. Then, we explore an advanced attention scheme given that two classes of input (real
vs. fake) are fed to the discriminator. We allow the discriminator to take two image
inputs at the same time: the reference image and the primary image where we set the
reference image to always be a real sample while the primary image to be either a real or
generated sample. The reference image is encoded to represent one part of the attention
components. These components are learned to guide the other part of the attention
components, which are encoded from the primary image. There are three insights in this
advancement. (1) An effective discriminator encodes real images and generated images
differently, so that reference-attention is capable of learning positive feedback given both
images from the real class and negative feedback given two images from different classes.
Such a scheme amplifies the representation difference between real and fake, and in turn
potentially strengthens the power of the discriminator. (2) Reference-attention enables
distribution estimation in the discriminator feature level beyond the discriminator logit
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level in the original GAN framework, which guides generation more strictly towards the
real distribution. (3) Reference-attention learns to cooperate real and generated images
explicitly in one round of back-propagation, instead of individually classifying them and
trivially averaging the gradients over one batch. Pairing up images mitigates discriminator
from overfitting, similar to the spirit of data augmentation.
In detail, we first encode the reference image and the primary image through the
original discriminator layers prior to the convolution at a certain resolution. To align
feature embeddings, we apply the Siamese architecture [82, 83] to share layer parameters
as shown in Fig. 7.1. We then apply the same attention scheme as used in the generator,
except we use the tensor Tref ∈ Rh×w×c from the reference branch to calculate the key
and query tensors, and use the tensor Tpri ∈ Rh×w×c from the primary branch to calculate
the value tensor and the residual shortcut. Finally, we replace the original convolution
output with our reference-attention output:
Oref
.
= attn (K(Tref),Q(Tref),V(Tpri)) + Tpri (2.8)
After the reference-attention layer, the two Siamese branches fuse into one and are
followed by the remaining discriminator layers to obtain the classification logit. We show
in Fig. 2.4 the diagram of reference-attention. Eq. 2.8 provides the flexibility how to
cooperate between reference and primary images.
From Table 2.5 we validate reference-attention mechanism (ref attn) to improve the
results whereas self-attention to be barely benefiting for the discriminator. Encouraged
with these findings, we run the proposed reference-attention on full-scale datasets but do
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CelebA Animal Face Bedroom Church
StyleGAN2 [17] 9.84 36.55 19.33 11.02
+ self attn in D 10.49 42.41 17.22 11.06
+ ref attn in D 7.48 31.08 8.32 7.86
Table 2.5: Comparisons in FID among different attention configurations in the
discriminator. StyleGAN2 config E which does not include any attention module is used
as a backbone. For computationally efficient comparisons, we use the 30k subset of each
dataset at 128×128 resolution.
Figure 2.6: Comparisons in FID between StyleGAN2 config E baseline (blue) and that
with our reference-attention in the discriminator (orange). Our method consistently
improves the baseline when dataset size varies between 1k and 30k images. For
computationally efficient comparisons, we use each dataset at 128×128 resolution.
not see any improvements. Therefore, we dive deep into reference-attentions behavior
in the discriminator with respect to the dataset size as given in Fig. 2.6. We find that
the reference-attention in the discriminator consistently improves the performance when
dataset size varies between 1k and 30k images, and on contrary slightly deteriorates the
performance when dataset sizes increase further. We reason that the arbitrary pair-up of
the reference and primary image inputs to prevent overfitting when data size is small but
causing underfitting with the increase of data size Even though in this paper our main
scope is GANs on large-scale datasets, we believe these findings to be very interesting for
researchers to design their networks for limited-scale datasets.
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2.4 Comparisons to the state of the art
Implementation details. All our models are built upon the most recent state-of-the-
art unconditional StyleGAN2 [17] config E for its high performance and reasonable speed.
We leverage the plug-and-play advantages of all our improvement proposals to strictly
follow StyleGAN2 official setup and training protocol, which facilitates reproducibility
and fair comparisons. For dual contrastive loss, we first warm up training with the default
non-saturating loss for about 20 epochs, and then switch to train with our loss.
Datasets. We use several benchmark datasets, 70K FFHQ face dataset [16], 3M
LSUN Bedroom dataset [20], 120K LSUN Church dataset [20], 2M LSUN Horse dataset [20],
CelebA face dataset [19] and Animal Face dataset [117], and 70K CLEVR [21] dataset
which contains rendered images with random compositions of 3D shapes, uniform materials,
uniform colors, point lighting, and a plain background. It poses different challenges from
the other common datasets: compositional scenes with occlusions, shadows, reflections,
and mirror surfaces. We use 256×256 resolution images for each of these datasets except
the CelebA and Animal Face datasets which are used in 128×128 resolutions. We do not
experiment with 1024×1024 resolution of FFHQ as it takes 9 days to train StyleGAN2
base model. Instead, we run extensive experiments on the mentioned various datasets. If
not otherwise noted, we use the whole dataset.
Evaluation. FID [118] is regarded as the golden standard to quantitatively evaluate
generation quality. We follow the protocol in StyleGAN2 [17] to report the FID between
50K generated images and 50K real testing images. The smaller the more desirable.
Comparisons. Besides StyleGAN2 [17], we also compare to a parallel state-of-the-
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Method Loss FFHQ Bedroom Church Horse CLEVR
BigGAN [14] Adv 11.4 - - - -
U-Net GAN [24] Adv 7.48 17.6 11.7 20.2 33.3
StyleGAN2 [17] Adv 4.86 4.01 4.54 3.91 9.62
StyleGAN2 w/ attn Adv 5.13 3.48 4.38 3.59 8.96
StyleGAN2 Contr 3.98 3.86 3.73 3.70 6.06
StyleGAN2 w/ attn Contr 4.63 3.31 3.39 2.97 5.05
Table 2.6: Comparisons in FID to the state-of-the-art GANs on the large-scale datasets.
We highlight the best in bold and second best with underline. “w/ attn” indicates using the
self-attention in the generator. “Contr” indicates using our dual contrastive loss instead of
conventional GAN loss.
art study, U-Net GAN [24], which was build upon and improved on BigGAN [14]. We
train U-Net by adapting it to the better backbone of StyleGAN2 [17] for fair comparison,
and obtain better results than their official release on non-FFHQ datasets. As shown in
Table 2.6, our self-attention generator improves on four out of five large-scale datasets,
up to 13.3% relative improvement on Bedroom dataset. This highlights the benefits of
attention to details and to long-range dependencies on complex scenes. However, self-
attention does not improve on the extensively studied FFHQ dataset. We reason that the
image pre-processing of facial landmark alignment compensates for the lack of attention
schemes, which makes previous works also overlook them on other datasets.
Our dual contrastive loss improves effectively on all the datasets, up to 37% improvement
on CLEVR dataset. This highlights the benefits of contrastive learning on generalized
representation, especially on aligned datasets, e.g. FFHQ and CLEVR, that can easily
make a traditional discriminator overfit. The synergy effective between self-attention and
contrastive learning is significant and consistent, resulting in at least 17.5% and up to
47.5% relative improvement on CLEVR. Especially for CLEVR, our generator handles
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Figure 2.7: Uncurated generated samples. To align the comparisons, we use the same
real query images for pre-trained generators to reconstruct. Artifacts from StyleGAN2
are highlighted with red boxes. Zoom in for details. In particular, our generation
significantly outperforms the baselines on CLEVR images which strongly rely on long-
range dependencies (occlusions, shadows, reflections, etc) and consistency (consistent
shadow directions, consistent specularity, regular shapes, uniform colors, etc).
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more realistically for occlusions, shadows, reflections, and mirror surfaces. As shown
in Fig. 6.3, our method suppresses artifacts that were previously visible in StyleGAN2
baseline outputs, with red boxes, e.g., the artifacts on the wall in Bedroom images,
discontinuities in the structure in Church images, as well as color leakage between objects
in CLEVR images.
2.5 Conclusion
The advancements in attention schemes and contrastive learning generate opportunities
for new designs of GANs. Our attention schemes serve as a beneficial replacement for
local and stationary convolutions, so as to equip generation and discriminator representation
with long-range adaptive dependencies. In particular, our reference-attention discriminator
cooperates between real reference images and primary images, mitigates discriminator
overfitting, and leads to further boost on limited-scale datasets. Additionally, our novel
contrastive loss generalizes discriminator representations, makes them more distinguishable
between real and fake, and in turn incentivizes better generation quality.
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Chapter 3: Texture Mixer: A Network for Controllable Synthesis and
Interpolation of Texture
3.1 Introduction
Many materials exhibit variation in local appearance, as well as complex transitions
between different materials. Editing materials in an image, however, can be highly
challenging due to the rich, spatially-varying material combinations as we see in the
natural world. One general research challenge then is to attempt to enable these kinds
of edits. In particular, in this paper, we focus on textures. We define “texture” as being
an image-space representation of a statistically homogeneous material, captured from a
top-down view. We further focus on allowing a user to both be able to accurately control
the placement of textures, as well as create plausible transitions between them.
Because of the complex appearance of textures, creating transitions by interpolating
between them on the pixel domain is difficult. Doing so naı̈vely results in unpleasant
artifacts such as ghosting, visible seams, and obvious repetitions. Researchers in texture
synthesis have therefore developed sophisticated algorithms to address this problem. These
may be divided to two families: non-parametric methods such as patch-based synthesis
(e.g. [119, 120, 121]) and parametric methods (e.g. [122, 123]), including neural network
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synthesis approaches (e.g. [124, 125, 126, 127, 128]). Previously, researchers used sophisticated
patch-based interpolation methods [129, 130] with carefully crafted objective functions.
However, such approaches are extremely slow. Moreover, due to the hand-crafted nature
of their objectives, they cannot learn from a large variety of textures in the natural world,
and as we show in our comparisons are often brittle and frequently result in less pleasing
transitions. Further, we are not aware of any existing feedforward neural network approaches
that offer both fine-grained controllable synthesis and interpolation between multiple
textures. User-controllable texture interpolation is substantially more challenging than
ordinary texture synthesis, because it needs to incorporate adherence to user-provided
boundary conditions and a smooth transition for the interpolated texture.
In our paper, we develop a neural network approach that we call “Texture Mixer”
which allows for both user control and interpolation of texture. We define the interpolation
of texture as a broad term, encompassing any combination of: (1) Either gradual or rapid
spatial transitions between two or more different textures, as shown in the palette, the
letters, and the background in Figure 3.1, and (2) Texture dissolve, where we can imagine
putting two textures in different layers, and cross-dissolving them according to a user-
controlled transparency, as we show in our video. Previous neural methods can create
interpolations similar to our dissolves by changing the latent variable [128, 131, 132,
133, 134]. Thus, in this paper we focus primarily on high-quality spatial interpolation:
this requires textures to coexist in the same image plane without visible seams or spatial
repetitions, which is more difficult to achieve. Our feedforward network is trained on a
large dataset of textures and runs at interactive rates.
Our approach addresses the difficulty of interpolating between textures on the image
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Figure 3.1: Texture interpolation and texture painting using our network on the animal
texture dataset. The top part shows a 1024 × 1024 palette created by interpolating four
source textures at the corners outside the palette. The bottom part shows a 512 × 2048
painting of letters with different textures sampled from the palette. The letters are
interpolated by our method with the background, also generated by our interpolation.
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domain by projecting these textures onto a latent domain where they may be linearly
interpolated, and then decoding them back into the image domain to obtain the desired
result. In order to satisfy the two goals of controllability and visual realism, we train our
network simultaneously for both tasks. A reconstruction task ensures that when a texture
is passed through an encoder and then a decoder (an autoencoder), the result will be
similar to the input. This allows the user to specify texture at any given point of the output
by example. An interpolation task uses a discriminator to ensure that linear interpolations
of latent tensors also decode into plausible textures, so that the regions of the output not
directly specified by the user are realistic and artifact-free. For this task, we can view
our network as a conditional Generative Adversarial Network (GAN). In effect, we thus
train an autoencoder and a conditional GAN at the same time, using shared weights and
a shared latent space.
To perform the interpolation task, we take texture samples that user specifies, and
project them into latent space using a learned encoder. Given these latent tensors, our
network then uses three intuitive latent-space operations: tiling, interpolation, and shuffling.
The tiling operation extends a texture spatially to any arbitrary size. The interpolation
operation uses weighted combinations of two or more textures in latent domain. The
shuffling operation swaps adjacent small squares within the latent tensor to reduce repetitions.
These new latent tensors are then decoded to obtain the interpolated result.
Our main contributions are: (1) a novel interactive technique that allows both user
control and interpolation of texture; (2) several practical and creative applications based
on our technique; (3) a new suite of metrics that evaluate user controllability, interpolation
smoothness, and interpolation realism; and (4) the state-of-the-art performance superior
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to previous work both based on these metrics, and based on a user study if we consider
them holistically.
3.2 Related Work
The problem of user-controllable texture interpolation has so far been under-explored.
It is however closely related to several other problems, most significantly texture synthesis,
inpainting, and stylization.
Texture synthesis algorithms can be divided into two families. The first one is
parametric, with a generative texture model. These algorithms include older, non-neural
methods [122, 123], and also more recent deep learning-based methods that are based
on optimization [124, 135, 136, 137] or trained feedforward models [125, 126, 127,
128]. Where the underlying model allows spatially varying weights for combination,
it may be used to cross-dissolve textures. However, we are not aware of any existing
texture synthesis techniques in this family that enables spatial transition between different
textures.
The second family of texture synthesis algorithms is non-parametric, in which
the algorithm produces output that is optimized to be as close as possible to the input
under some appearance measure [119, 120, 121, 129, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143,
144]. These can be formulated to accept two different inputs and spatially vary which
is being compared to, facilitating interpolation [129, 130]. As we mentioned before, such
approaches are slow, and due to the hand-crafted nature of their objectives, they tend to
be brittle.
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Recently, generative adversarial networks (GANs) [7, 65, 66, 145] have shown
improved realism in image synthesis and translation tasks [29, 31, 146]. GANs have
also been used directly for texture synthesis [127, 147, 148], however, they were limited
to a single texture they were trained on. A recent approach dubbed PSGAN [149] learns to
synthesize a collection of textures present in a single photograph, making it more general
and applicable to texture interpolation; it is not, however, designed for our problem as
it cannot interpolate existing images. We show comparisons with PSGAN and it cannot
reconstruct many input textures, even after running a sophisticated optimization or jointly
associating PSGAN with an encoder. Moreover, PSGAN can suffer from mode collapse.
Texture synthesis and image inpainting algorithms are often closely related. A good
hole filling algorithm needs to be able to produce some sort of transition between textures
on opposite ends of the hole, and so may be used in a texture interpolation task. A few
recent deep learning-based methods showed promising results [5, 51, 150, 151].
Finally, some neural stylization approaches [127, 131, 133, 135] based on separating
images into content and style components have shown that, by stylizing a noise content
image, they can effectively synthesize texture [124]. By spatially varying the style component,
texture interpolation may thus be achieved.
3.3 Our network: Texture Mixer
In this section, we explain how our network works. We first explain in Section 3.3.1
how our method is trained. We then show how our training losses are set up in Section 3.3.2.




We aim to train our network simultaneously for two tasks: reconstruction and
interpolation. The reconstruction task ensures that every input texture after being encoded
and then decoded results in a similar texture. Meanwhile, the interpolation task ensures
that interpolations of latent tensors are also decoded into plausible textures.
Our method can be viewed as a way of training a network containing both encoders
and a generator, such that the generator is effectively a portion of a GAN. The network
accepts a source texture S as input. A global encoder Eg(S) encodes S into a latent
vector zg, which can also be viewed as a latent tensor with spatial size 1 × 1. A local
encoder El(S) encodes the source texture into a latent tensor zl, which has a spatial size
that is a factor m smaller than the size of the input texture: we use m = 4. The generator
G(zl, zg) concatenates zl and zg, and can decode these latent tensors back into a texture
patch, so that ideally G(El(S), Eg(S)) = S, which encompasses the reconstruction task.
Our generator is fully convolutional, so that it can generate output textures of arbitrary
size: the output texture size is directly proportional to the size of the local tensor zl. A
discriminator Drec is part of the reconstruction loss. An identical but separately trained
discriminator Ditp evaluates the realism of interpolation.
Note that in practice, our generator network is implemented as taking a global tensor
as input, which has the same spatial size as the local tensor. This is because, for some
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Figure 3.2: A diagram of our method. Background color highlights each of the tasks.
Trapezoids represent trainable components that share weights if names match. Rounded
rectangles represent the losses. Arrows and circles represent operations on tensor data.
to G taking a global latent vector zg with spatial size 1× 1 as input, what we mean is that
this zg vector is first repeated spatially to match the size of zl, and the generator is run on
the result.
We show the full training setup in Figure 3.2. We will also explain our setup in
terms of formulas here. As is shown in the upper-left of Figure 3.2, the network is given
two real source texture images S1 and S2 from the real texture dataset S. Each local
encoder El encodes Si (i ∈ {1, 2}) to a local latent tensor zli = El(Si). Meanwhile, each
global encoder Eg encodes Si to a global latent vector z
g




latent variables are shown in green and blue boxes in the upper-left of Figure 3.2.





i ). These are shown in the upper center of Figure 3.2. For each reconstructed
image Ŝi, we then impose a weighted sum of three losses against the original texture Si.
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We describe these losses in more detail later in Section 3.3.2.
For the interpolation task, we pose the process of multiple texture interpolation
as a problem of simultaneously (1) synthesizing a larger texture, and (2) interpolating
between two different textures. In this manner, the network learns to perform well for
both single and multiple texture synthesis. For single texture synthesis, we enlarge the
generated images by a factor of 3 × 3. We do this by tiling zli spatially by a factor of
3× 3. We denote this tiling by T (zli), and indicate tiling by a tile icon in the lower-left of
Figure 3.2. We chose the factor 3 because this is the smallest integer that can synthesize
transitions over the four edges of zli. Such a small tiling factor minimizes computational
cost. The tiling operation can be beneficial for regular textures. However, in semiregular
or stochastic textures, the tiling introduces two artifacts: undesired spatial repetitions, and
undesired seams on borders between tiles.
We reduce these artifacts by applying a random shuffling to the tiled latent tensors
T (zli). In Figure 3.2, this shuffling operation is indicated by a dice icon. Random shuffling
in the latent space not only results in more varied decoded image appearance and thus
reduces visual repetition, but also softens seams by spatially swapping “pixels” in the
latent space across the border of two zli tensors.
We implement the random shuffling by row and column swapping over several
scales from coarse to fine. For this coarse to fine process, we use scales that are powers
of two: si = 2i for i = 0, 2, . . . , n. We set the coarsest scale n to give a scale sn that
is half the size of the local tensor zli. For each scale si, we define a grid over the tiled
latent tensor T (zl), where each grid cell has size si × si. For each scale si, we then
apply a random shuffling on cells of the grid for that scale: we denote this by Pi. This
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shuffling proceeds through grid rows first in top-down and then bottom-up order: each
row is randomly swapped with the succeeding row with probability 0.5. Similarly, this is
repeated on grid columns, with column swapping from left to right and right to left. Thus,










We also want the synthesized texture to be able to transit smoothly between regions
where there are user-specified texture constraints and regions where there are none. Thus,
we override the original zli without shuffling at the 4 corners of the tiled latent tensor. We





If we apply the fully convolutional generator G to a network trained using a single
input texture and the above shuffling process, it will work for single texture synthesis.
However, for multiple texture interpolation, we additionally apply interpolation in the
latent space before calling G, as inspired by [128, 131, 149]. We randomly sample an
interpolation parameter α ∼ U [0, 1], and then interpolate the latent tensors using α. This





and P̃ (T (zl2))
)
, which results in the final interpolated latent tensor Z l:










In the same way, we blend zg1 and z
g
2 to obtain
Zg = αzg1 + (1− α)zg2 (3.3)
Finally, we feed the tiled and blended tensors into the generatorG to obtain an interpolated
texture image I = G(Z l, Zg), which is shown on the right in Figure 3.2. From the
interpolated texture, we take a random crop of the same size as the input textures. The
crop is shown in the red dotted lines in Figure 3.2. The crop is then compared using
appropriately α-weighted losses to each of the source textures. We use spatially uniform
weights α at training time because all the real-world examples are spatially homogeneous
and we do not want our adversarial discriminator to detect our synthesized texture due to
it having spatial variation. In contrast, at testing time, we use spatially varying weights.
3.3.2 Training losses
For the reconstruction task, we use three losses. The first loss is a pixel-wise L1 loss
against each input Si. The second loss is a Gram matrix loss against each input Si, based
on an ImageNet-pretrained VGG-19 model. We define the Gram loss LGram in the same
manner as Johnson [126], and use the features relui 1 for i = 1, . . . , 5. The third loss is
an adversarial loss Ladv based on WGAN-GP [66], where the reconstruction discriminator
Drec tries to classify whether the reconstructed image is from the real source texture set
or generated by the network. The losses are:
Lrecpix = ‖Ŝ1 − S1‖1 + ‖Ŝ2 − S2‖1 (3.4)
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LrecGram = LGram(Ŝ1, S1) + LGram(Ŝ2, S2) (3.5)
Lrecadv = Ladv(Ŝ1, S1|Drec) + Ladv(Ŝ2, S2|Drec) (3.6)
The Ladv term is defined from WGAN-GP [66] as:
Ladv(A,B|D) = D(A)−D(B) +GP (A,B|D) (3.7)
Here A and B are a pair of input images, D is the adversarially trained discriminator, and
GP (·) is the gradient penalty regularization term.
For the interpolation task, we expect the large interpolated texture image to be
similar to some combination of the two input textures. Specifically, if α = 1, the
interpolated image should be similar to source texture S1, and if α = 0, it should be
similar to S2. However, we do not require pixel-wise similarity, because that would
encourage ghosting. We thus impose only a Gram matrix and an adversarial loss. We
select a random crop Icrop from the interpolated texture image. Then the Gram matrix loss
for interpolation is defined as an α-weighted loss to each source texture:
LitpGram = αLGram(Icrop, S1) + (1− α)LGram(Icrop, S2) (3.8)
Similarly, we adversarially train the interpolation discriminatorDitp for the interpolation
task to classify whether its input image is from the real source texture set or whether it is
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a synthetically generated interpolation:
Litpadv = αLadv(Icrop, S1|Ditp) + (1− α)Ladv(Icrop, S2|Ditp) (3.9)




















where λ1 = 100, λ2 = λ4 = 0.001, and λ3 = λ5 = 1 are used to balance the order of
magnitude of each loss term, which are not sensitive to dataset.
3.3.3 Testing and user interactions
At testing time, we can use our network in several different ways: we can interpolate
sparsely placed textures, brush with textures, dissolve between textures, and hybridize
different animal regions in one image. Each of these applications utilizes spatially varying
interpolation weights.
Interpolation of sparsely placed textures. This option is shown in the palette and
background in Figure 3.1. In this scenario, one or more textures are placed down by the
user in the image domain. These textures are each encoded to latent domain.
In most cases, given input textures, our method is able to achieve inherent boundary
matching and continuity. However, because of the trade-off between reconstruction and
interpolation losses, there might be a slight mismatch in some cases. To make the textures
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Figure 3.3: A sequence of dissolve video frame samples with size 1024 × 1024 on the
animal texture dataset, where each frame is also with effect of interpolation.
better agree at boundary conditions, we postprocess our images as follows. Suppose that
the user places a source textured region as a boundary condition. We first replace the
reconstructed regions with the source texture. Then, within the source texture, we use
graph cuts [139] to determine an optimal seam where we can cut between the source
texture and the reconstruction. Finally, we use Poisson blending [152] to minimize the
visibility of this seam.
Texture brush. We can allow the user to brush with texture as follows. We assume
that there is a textured background region, which we have encoded to latent space. The
user can select any texture to brush with, by first encoding the brush texture and then
brushing in the latent space. For example, in Figure 3.1 we show an example of selecting
a texture from a palette created by interpolating four sparsely created textures. We find
the brush texture’s latent domain tensors, and apply them using a Gaussian-weighted
brush. Here full weight in the brush causes the background latent tensors to be replaced
entirely, and other weights cause a proportionately decreased effect. The brush can easily
be placed spatially because the latent and image domains are aligned with a resizing factor
m related to the architecture.
Texture dissolve. We can create a cross-dissolve effect between any two textures
42
Figure 3.4: An animal hybridization example of size 1260 × 1260 between a dog and a
bear. Our interpolation between the two animal furs is smoother, has less ghosting, and is
more realistic than that of the Naı̈ve α-blending.
by encoding them both to latent domain and then blending between them using blending
weights that are spatially uniform. This effect is best visualized in a video, where time
controls the dissolve effect. Figure 3.3 shows a sequence of video frame samples with
gradually varying weights.
Animal hybridization. We generalize texture interpolation into a more practical
and creative application - animal hybridization. Figure 3.4 shows an example. Given two
aligned animal regions in one image and a hole over the transition region, we can sample
source texture patches adjacent to the hole and conduct spatial interpolation among those
textures. We fill the hole using our interpolated texture. Finally, we use graph cuts [139]
and Poisson blending [152] to postprocess the boundaries.
3.4 Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate experimental comparisons. We first introduce our
own datasets in Section 3.4.1. We then present in Section 3.4.2 a suite of evaluation
43
metrics for interpolation quality. In Section 3.4.3 we list and compare against several
leading methods from different categories on the task of texture interpolation. In Section 3.4.4
we describe a user study as a holistic comparison. Finally, we conduct in Section 3.4.5
the ablation study by comparing against three simplified versions of our own method.
We propose to learn a model per texture category rather than a universal model
because: (1) there are no real-world examples that depict interpolation between distinct
texture categories; (2) there is no practical reason to interpolate across categories, e.g., fur
and gravel; and (3) like with other GANs, a specific model per category performs better
than a universal one due to the model’s capacity limit.
3.4.1 Datasets
Training to interpolate frontal-parallel stationary textures of a particular category
requires a dataset with a rich set of examples to represent the intra-variability of that
category. Unfortunately, most existing texture datasets such as DTD [153] are intended
for texture classification tasks, and do not have enough samples per category (only 120 in
the case of DTD) to cover the texture appearance space with sufficient density.
Therefore, we collected two datasets of our own: (1) the earth texture dataset
contains Creative Commons images from Flickr, which we randomly split into 896 training
and 98 testing images; (2) the animal texture dataset contains images from Adobe Stock,
randomly split into 866 training and 95 testing images. All textures are real-world RGB
photos with arbitrary sizes larger than 512 × 512. Examples from both are shown in our
figures throughout the paper.
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We further augmented all our training and testing sets by applying: (1) color histogram
matching with a random reference image in the same dataset; (2) random geometric
transformations including horizontal and vertical mirroring, random in-plane rotation and
downscaling (up to ×4); and (3) randomly cropping a size of 128 × 128. In this way,
we augmented 1, 000 samples for each training image and 100 samples for each testing
image.
3.4.2 Evaluation
We will compare previous work with ours, and also do an ablation study on our own
method. In order to fairly compare all methods, we use a horizontal interpolation task.
Specifically, we randomly sampled two 128× 128 squares from the test set. We call these
the side textures. We placed them as constraints on either end of a 128 × 1024 canvas.
We then used each method to produce the interpolation on the canvas, configuring each
method to interpolate linearly where such option is available.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no standard method to quantitatively evaluate
texture interpolation. We found existing generation evaluation techniques [7, 118, 132,
154] inadequate for our task. We, therefore, developed a suite of metrics that evaluate
three aspects we consider crucial for our task: (1) user controllability, (2) interpolation
smoothness, and (3) interpolation realism. We now discuss these.
User controllability. For interpolation to be considered controllable, it has to
closely reproduce the user’s chosen texture at the user’s chosen locations. In our experiment,
we measure this as the reconstruction quality for the side textures. We average the LPIPS
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perceptual similarity measure [8] for the two side textures. We call this Side Perceptual
Distance (SPD).
We also would like the center of the interpolation to be similar to both side textures.
To measure this, we consider the Gram matrix loss [126] between the central 128 × 128
crop of the interpolation and the side textures. We report the sum of distances from the
center crop to the two side textures, normalized by the Gram distance between the two.
We call this measure the Center Gram Distance (CGD).
Interpolation smoothness. Ideally, we would like the interpolation to follow the
shortest path between the two side textures. To measure this, we construct two difference
vectors of Gram matrix features between the left side texture and the center crop, and
between the center crop and the right side texture, and measure the cosine distance
between the two vectors. We expect this Centre Cosine distance (CCD) to be minimized.
For smoothness, the appearance change should be gradual, without abrupt changes
such as seams and cuts. To measure such, we train a seam classifier using real samples
from the training set as negative examples, and where we create synthetic seams by
concatenating two random textures as positive examples. We run this classifier on the
center crop. We call this the Center Seam Score (CSS). The architecture and training
details of seam classifier are the same as those of Drec and Ditp.
Interpolation realism. The texture should also look realistic, like the training
set. To measure this, we chose the Inception Score [7] and Sliced Wasserstein Distance
(SWD) [132], and apply them on the center crops. This gives Center Inception Score
(CIS) and Center SWD, respectively. For CIS, we use the state-of-the-art Inception-
ResNet-v2 inception model architecture [155] finetuned with our two datasets separately.
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We also found these metrics do not capture undesired repetitions, a common texture
synthesis artifact. We, therefore, trained a repetition classifier for this purpose. We call
this the Center Repetition Score (CRS). The architecture and training details of repetition
classifier are almost the same as those of the seam classifier except the input image size
is 128× 256 instead of 128× 128, where the negative examples are random crops of size
128 × 256 from real datasets and the positive examples are horizontally tiled twice from
random crops of size 128× 128 from real datasets.
3.4.3 Comparisons
We compare against several leading methods from different categories on the task
of texture interpolation. These include: naı̈ve α-blending, Image Melding [129] as a
representative of patch-based techniques, two neural stylization methods - AdaIN [131]
and WCT [133], a recent deep hole-filling method called DeepFill [5], and PSGAN [149]
which is the closest to ours but without user control. Most these had to be adapted for
our task. Fig. 3.5 contains a qualitative comparison between the different methods. Note
that in this example: (1) the overly sharp interpolation of DeepFill, (2) the undesired
ghosting and repetition artifacts of naı̈ve α-blending and ours (no shuffling), (3) the
incorrect reconstruction and less relevant interpolation of AdaIN, WCT, and PSGAN,
(4) the appearance mismatch between source and interpolation of Image Melding, (5) the
lack of smoothness of ours (no zg), and (6) the undesired fading of ours (no blending).
We also report qualitative results, including the user study and the ablation experiments,
in Table 3.1, that contains average values for the two datasets - earth texture and animal
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Figure 3.5: Qualitative demonstrations and comparisons of horizontal interpolation in the
size of 128×1024 on the earth texture samples. We use the two side crops with the orange
background for SPD measurement, and the center crop with the light yellow background
for the other proposed quantitative evaluations. For the DeepFill [5] method, since the
default design is not suitable for inpainting a wide hole due to lack of such ground truth,
we instead test it on a shorter interpolation of size 128× 384.
48
Controllability Smoothness Realism User study Testing
SPD CGD CCD CSS CRS CIS CSWD PR p-value time
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇑ ⇓
Naı̈ve α-blending 0.0000 1.255 0.777 0.9953 0.4384 22.35 60.93 0.845 < 10−6 0.02 s
Image Melding [129] 0.0111 1.289 0.865 0.0005 0.0004 29.45 47.09 0.672 < 10−6 6 min
WCT [133] 0.8605 1.321 0.988 0.0020 0.0000 9.86 46.89 0.845 < 10−6 7.5 s
PSGAN [149] 1.1537 1.535 1.156 0.0069 0.0005 26.81 35.90 0.967 < 10−6 1.4 min
Ours (no zg) 0.0112 1.207 0.680 0.0078 0.0010 21.04 21.54 - - -
Ours (no blending) 0.0103 1.272 0.817 0.0125 0.0009 22.24 52.29 - - -
Ours (no shuffling) 0.0107 1.129 0.490 0.0534 0.2386 26.78 20.99 - - -
Ours 0.0113 1.177 0.623 0.0066 0.0008 26.68 22.10 - - 0.5 s
Table 3.1: Quantitative evaluation averaging over the earth texture and animal texture
datasets. We highlighited the best, second best and very high values for each metric. We

























































Figure 3.6: Radar charts visualizing Table 3.1. Values have been normalized to the unit
range, and axes inverted so that higher value is always better. The first four are baseline
methods and next three ablation candidates, with the last entry representing our full
method. Our method scores near-top marks all around and shows balanced performance
according to all metrics.
texture. Figure 3.6 summarizes the quantitative comparisons.
3.4.4 User study
We also conducted a user study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We presented the
users with a binary choice, asking them if they aesthetically prefer our method or one of
the baseline methods on a random example from the horizontal interpolation task. For
each method pair, we sampled 90 examples and collected 5 independent user responses
per example. Tallying the user votes, we get 90 results per method pair. We assumed
a null hypothesis that on average, our method will be preferred by 2.5 users for a given
method pair. We used a one-sample permutation t-test to measure p-values, using 106
49
permutations, and found the p-values for the null hypothesis are all< 10−6. This indicates
that the users do prefer one method over another. To quantify this preference, we count
for each method pair all the examples where at least 3 users agree in their preference,
and report a preference rate (PR) which shows how many of the preferences were in our
method’s favor. Both PR and the p-values are listed in Table 3.1.
3.4.5 Ablation study
We also compare against simplified versions of our method. The qualitative results
for this comparison are shown in Figure 3.5. We report quantitative result numbers in
Table 3.1, and visualized them in Figure 3.6. We ablate the following components:
Remove zg. The only difference between zg and zl is in the tiling and shuffling for
zl. However, if we remove zg, we find texture transitions are less smooth and gradual.
Remove texture blending during training. We modify our method so that the
interpolation task during training is performed only upon two identical textures. This
makes the interpolation discriminatorDitp not be aware of the realism of blended samples,
so testing realism deteriorates.
Remove random shuffling. We skip the shuffling operation in latent space and
only perform blending during training. This slightly improves realism and interpolation
directness, but causes visually disturbing repetitions.
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3.5 Conclusion
We presented a novel method for controllable interpolation of textures. We were
able to satisfy the criteria of controllability, smoothness, and realism. Our method outperforms
several baselines on our newly collected datasets. As we see in Figure 3.6, although some
baseline method may achieve better results than ours on one of the evaluation criteria,
they usually fail on the others. In contrast, our method has consistent high marks in all
evaluation categories. The user study also shows the users overwhelmingly prefer our
method to any of the baselines. We have also demonstrated several applications based on
this technique and hope it may become a building block of more complex workflows.
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Chapter 4: Attributing Fake Images to GANs: Learning and Analyzing
GAN Fingerprints
4.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, photorealistic image generation and manipulation techniques
have rapidly evolved. Visual contents can now be easily created and edited without
leaving obvious perceptual traces [156]. Recent breakthroughs in generative adversarial
networks (GANs) [7, 65, 66, 145, 157, 158] have further improved the quality and photorealism
of generated images. The adversarial framework of GANs can also be used in conditional
scenarios for image translation [29, 30, 31] or manipulation in a given context [72, 159,
160, 161, 162], which diversifies media synthesis.
At the same time, however, the success of GANs has raised two challenges to the
vision community: visual forensics and intellectual property protection.
GAN challenges to visual forensics. There is a widespread concern about the
impact of this technology when used maliciously. This issue has also received increasing
public attention, in terms of disruptive consequences to visual security, laws, politics, and
society in general [163, 164, 165]. Therefore, it is critical to look into effective visual
forensics against threats from GANs.
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Figure 4.1: A t-SNE [6] visual comparison between our fingerprint features (right) and the
baseline inception features [7] (left) for image attribution. Inception features are highly
entangled, indicating the challenge to differentiate high-quality GAN-generated images
from real ones. However, our result shows any single difference in GAN architectures,
training sets, or even initialization seeds can result in distinct fingerprint features for
effective attribution.
While recent state-of-the-art visual forensics techniques demonstrate impressive
results for detecting fake visual media [166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175],
they have only focused on semantic, physical, or statistical inconsistency of specific
forgery scenarios, e.g., copy-move manipulations[166, 175] or face swapping [173]. Forensics
on GAN-generated images [176, 177, 178] shows good accuracy, but each method operates
on only one GAN architecture by identifying its unique artifacts and results deteriorate
when the GAN architecture is changed. It is still an open question of whether GANs leave
stable marks that are commonly shared by their generated images. That motivates us to
investigate an effective feature representation that differentiates GAN-generated images
from real ones.
GAN challenges to intellectual property protection. Similar to other successful
applications of deep learning technology to image recognition [179] or natural language
processing [180], building a product based on GANs is non-trivial [181, 182, 183]. It
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requires a large amount of training data, powerful computing resources, significant machine
learning expertise, and numerous trial-and-error iterations for identifying optimal model
architectures and their model hyper-parameters. As GAN services become widely deployed
with commercial potential, they will become increasingly vulnerable to pirates. Such
copyright plagiarism may jeopardize the intellectual property of model owners and take
future market share from them. Therefore, methods for attributing GAN-generated image
origins are highly desirable for protecting intellectual property.
Given the level of realism that GAN techniques already achieve today, attribution
by human inspection is no longer feasible (see the mixture of Figure 4.4). The state-
of-the-art digital identification techniques can be separated into two categories: digital
watermarking and digital fingerprint detection. Neither of them is applicable to GAN
attribution. Previous work on watermarking deep neural networks [184, 185] depends on
an embedded security scheme during “white-box” model training, requires control of the
input, and is impractical when only GAN-generated images are accessible in a “black-
box” scenario. Previous work on digital fingerprints is limited to device fingerprints [186,
187] or in-camera post-processing fingerprints [188], which cannot be easily adapted to
GAN-generated images. That motivates us to investigate GAN fingerprints that attribute
different GAN-generated images to their sources.
We present the first study addressing the two GAN challenges simultaneously by
learning GAN fingerprints for image attribution: We introduce GAN fingerprints and use
them to classify an image as real or GAN-generated. For GAN-generated images, we
further identify their sources. We approach this by training a neural network classifier
and predicting the source of an image. Our experiments show that GANs carry distinct
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model fingerprints and leave stable fingerprints in their generated images, which support
image attribution.
We summarize our contributions as demonstrating the existence, uniqueness, persistence,
immunizability, and visualization of GAN fingerprints. We address the following questions:
Existence and uniqueness: Which GAN parameters differentiate image attribution?
We present experiments on GAN parameters including architecture, training data, as well
as random initialization seed. We find that a difference in any one of these parameters
results in a unique GAN fingerprint for image attribution. See Figure 7.1, Section 5.5.7
and 4.4.2.
Persistence: Which image components contain fingerprints for attribution? We
investigate image components in different frequency bands and in different patch sizes.
In order to eliminate possible bias from GAN artifact components, we apply a perceptual
similarity metric to distill an artifact-free subset for attribution evaluation. We find that
GAN fingerprints are persistent across different frequencies and patch sizes, and are not
dominated by artifacts. See Section 4.3.1 and 4.4.3.
Immunizability: How robust is attribution to image perturbation attacks and how
effective are the defenses? We investigate common attacks that aim at destroying image
fingerprints. They include noise, blur, cropping, JPEG compression, relighting, and
random combinations of them. We also defend against such attacks by finetuning our
attribution classifier. See Section 4.4.4.
Visualization: How to expose GAN fingerprints? We propose an alternative classifier
variant to explicitly visualize GAN fingerprints in the image domain, so as to better
interpret the effectiveness of attribution. See Section 4.3.2 and 4.4.5.
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Comparison to baselines. In terms of attribution accuracy, our method consistently
outperforms three baseline methods (including a very recent one [189]) on two datasets
under a variety of experimental conditions. In terms of feature representation, our fingerprints
show superior distinguishability across image sources compared to inception features [7].
4.2 Related work
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). GANs [7, 65, 66, 145, 157, 158]
have shown improved photorealism in image synthesis [127, 148, 190], translation [29,
30, 31], or manipulation [159, 160, 191]. We focus on unconditional GANs as the subject
of our study. We choose the following four GAN models as representative candidates
of the current state of the art: ProGAN [157], SNGAN [13], CramerGAN [192], and
MMDGAN [154], considering their outstanding performances on face generation.
Visual forensics. Visual forensics targets detecting statistical or physics-based
artifacts and then recognizing the authenticity of visual media without evidence from an
embedded security mechanism [168, 193]. An example is a steganalysis-based method [194],
which uses hand-crafted features plus a linear Support Vector Machine to detect forgeries.
Recent CNN-based methods [169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 195, 196, 197] learn
deep features and further improve tampering detection performance on images or videos.
Rössler [198, 199] introduced a large-scale face manipulation dataset to benchmark
forensics classification and segmentation tasks, and demonstrated superior performance
when using additional domain-specific knowledge. For forensics on GAN-generated
images, several existing works [176, 177, 178] show good accuracy. However, each
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method considers only one GAN architecture and results do not generalize across architectures.
Digital fingerprints. Prior digital fingerprint techniques focus on detecting hand-
crafted features for either device fingerprints or postprocessing fingerprints. The device
fingerprints rely on the fact that individual devices, due to manufacturing imperfections,
leave a unique and stable mark on each acquired image, i.e., the photo-response non-
uniformity (PRNU) pattern [186, 187]. Likewise, postprocessing fingerprints come from
the specific in-camera postprocessing suite (demosaicking, compression, etc.) during
each image acquisition procedure [188]. Recently, Marra [189] visualize GAN fingerprints
based on PRNU, and show their application to GAN source identification. We replace
their hand-crafted fingerprint formulation with a learning-based one, decoupling model
fingerprint from image fingerprint, and show superior performances in a variety of experimental
conditions.
Digital watermarking. Digital watermarking is a complementary forensics technique
for image authentication [200, 201, 202]. It involves embedding artificial watermarks
in images. It can be used to reveal image source and ownership so as to protect their
copyright. It has been shown that neural networks can also be actively watermarked
during training [184, 185]. In such models, a characteristic pattern can be built into
the learned representation but with a trade-off between watermarking accuracy and the
original performance. However, such watermarking has not been studied for GANs. In
contrast, we utilize inherent fingerprints for image attribution without any extra embedding
burden or quality deterioration.
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4.3 Fingerprint learning for image attribution
Inspired by the prior works on digital fingerprints [186, 188], we introduce the
concepts of GAN model fingerprint and image fingerprint. Both are simultaneously
learned from an image attribution task.
Model fingerprint. Each GAN model is characterized by many parameters: training
dataset distribution, network architecture, loss design, optimization strategy, and hyper-
parameter settings. Because of the non-convexity of the objective function and the instability
of adversarial equilibrium between the generator and discriminator in GANs, the values
of model weights are sensitive to their random initializations and do not converge to
the same values during each training. This indicates that even though two well-trained
GAN models may perform equivalently, they generate high-quality images differently.
This suggests the existence and uniqueness of GAN fingerprints. We define the model
fingerprint per GAN instance as a reference vector, such that it consistently interacts with
all its generated images. In a specifically designed case, the model fingerprint can be an
RGB image the same size as its generated images. See Section 4.3.2.
Image fingerprint. GAN-generated images are the outcomes of a large number
of fixed filtering and non-linear processes, which generate common and stable patterns
within the same GAN instances but are distinct across different GAN instances. That
suggests the existence of image fingerprints and attributability towards their GAN sources.
We introduce the fingerprint per image as a feature vector encoded from that image. In
a specifically designed case, an image fingerprint can be an RGB image the same size as
the original image. See Section 4.3.2.
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Attribution network Similar to the authorship attribution task in natural language
processing [203, 204], we train an attribution classifier that can predict the source of an
image: real or from a GAN model.
We approach this using a deep convolutional neural network supervised by image-
source pairs {(I, y)} where I ∼ I is sampled from an image set and y ∈ Y is the source
ground truth belonging to a finite set. That set is composed of pre-trained GAN instances
plus the real world. Figure 4.2(a) depicts an overview of our attribution network.
We implicitly represent image fingerprints as the final classifier features (the 1×1×
512 tensor before the final fully connected layer) and represent GAN model fingerprints
as the corresponding classifier parameters (the 1× 1× 512 weight tensor of the final fully
connected layer).
Why is it necessary to use such an external classifier when GAN training already
provides a discriminator? The discriminator learns a hyperplane in its own embedding
space to distinguish generated images from real ones. Different embedding spaces are
not aligned. In contrast, the proposed classifier necessarily learns a unified embedding
space to distinguish generated images from different GAN instances or from real images.
Note that our motivation to investigate “white-box” GANs subject to known parameters
is to validate the attributability along different GAN parameter dimensions. In practice,
our method also applies to “black-box” GAN API services. The only required supervision
is the source label of an image. We can simply query different services, collect their
generated images, and label them by service indices. Our classifier would test image
authenticity by predicting if an image is sampled from the desired service. We also test
service authenticity by checking if most of their generated images have the desired source
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4.2: Different attribution network architectures. Tensor representation is specified
by two spatial dimensions followed by the number of channels. The network is
trained to minimize cross-entropy classification loss. (a) Attribution network. (b)
Pre-downsampling network example that downsamples input image to 8 × 8 before
convolution. (c) Pre-downsampling residual network example that extracts the residual
component between 16×16 and 8×8 resolutions. (d) Post-pooling network example that
starts average pooling at 64× 64 resolution.
prediction.
4.3.1 Component analysis networks
In order to analyze which image components contain fingerprints, we propose three
variants of the network.
Pre-downsampling network. We propose to test whether fingerprints and attribution
can be derived from different frequency bands. We investigate attribution performance
w.r.t. downsampling factor. Figure 4.2(b) shows an architecture example that extracts
low-frequency bands. We replace the trainable convolution layers with our Gaussian
downsampling layers from the input end and systematically control at which resolution
we stop such replacement.
Pre-downsampling residual network. Complementary to extracting low-frequency
60
bands, Figure 4.2(c) shows an architecture example that extracts a residual high-frequency
band between one resolution and its factor-2 downsampled resolution. It is reminiscent
of a Laplacian Pyramid [205]. We systematically vary the resolution at which we extract
such residual.
Post-pooling network. We propose to test whether fingerprints and attribution can
be derived locally based on patch statistics. We investigate attribution performance w.r.t.
patch size. Figure 4.2(d) shows an architecture example. Inspired by PatchGAN [29],
we regard a “pixel” in a neural tensor as the feature representation of a local image patch
covered by the receptive field of that “pixel”. Therefore, post-pooling operations count
for patch-based neural statistics. Earlier post-pooling corresponds to a smaller patch size.
We systematically vary at which tensor resolution we start this pooling in order to switch
between more local and more global patch statistics.
4.3.2 Fingerprint visualization
Alternatively to our attribution network in Section 5.5.7 where fingerprints are
implicitly represented in the feature domain, we describe a model similar in spirit to
Marra [189] to explicitly represent them in the image domain. But in contrast to their
hand-crafted PRNU-based representation, we modify our attribution network architecture
and learn fingerprint images from image-source pairs ({I, y}). We also decouple the
representation of model fingerprints from image fingerprints. Figure 4.3 depicts the
fingerprint visualization model.
Abstractly, we learn to map from input image to its fingerprint image. But without
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Figure 4.3: Fingerprint visualization diagram. We train an AutoEncoder and GAN
fingerprints end-to-end.  indicates pixel-wise multiplication of two normalized images.
fingerprint supervision, we choose to ground the mapping based on a reconstruction task
with an AutoEncoder. We then define the reconstruction residual as the image fingerprint.
We simultaneously learn a model fingerprint for each source (each GAN instance plus the
real world), such that the correlation index between one image fingerprint and each model
fingerprint serves as softmax logit for classification.
Mathematically, given an image-source pair (I, y) where y ∈ Y belongs to the
finite set Y of GAN instances plus the real world, we formulate a reconstruction mapping
R from I to R(I). We ground our reconstruction based on pixel-wise L1 loss plus
adversarial loss:














where Drec is an adversarially trained discriminator, and GP(·) is the gradient penalty
regularization term defined in [66].
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We further explicitly define model fingerprint F ymod as freely trainable parameters




mod), the correlation index between F
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and F ymod, is maximized over Y. This can be formulated as the softmax logit for the
cross-entropy classification loss supervised by the source ground truth:










where corr(A,B) = Â  B̂, Â and B̂ are the zero-mean, unit-norm, and vectorized
version of images A and B, and  is the inner product operation.







(λ1Lpix + λ2Ladv + λ3Lcls) (4.4)
where λ1 = 20.0, λ2 = 0.1, and λ3 = 1.0 are used to balance the order of magnitude of
each loss term, which are not sensitive to dataset and are fixed.
Note that this network variant is used to better visualize and interpret the effectiveness
of image attribution. However, it introduces extra training complexity and thus is not used
if we only focus on attribution.
63
4.4 Experiments
We discuss the experimental setup in Section 7.4.1. From Section 4.4.2 to 4.4.5, we
explore the four research questions discussed in the Introduction.
4.4.1 Setup
Datasets. We employ CelebA human face dataset [206] and LSUN bedroom scene
dataset [207], both containing 20, 000 real-world RGB images.
GAN models. We consider four recent state-of-the-art GAN architectures: ProGAN [157],
SNGAN [13], CramerGAN [192], and MMDGAN [154]. Each model is trained from
scratch with their default settings except we fix the number of training epochs to 240 and
fix the output size of a generator to 128× 128× 3.
Baseline methods. Given real-world datasets and four pre-trained GAN models,
we compare with three baseline classification methods: k-nearest-neighbor (kNN) on raw
pixels, Eigenface [208], and the very recent PRNU-based fingerprint method from Marra
[189].
Evaluation. We use classification accuracy to evaluate image attribution performance.
In addition, we use the ratio of inter-class and intra-class Fréchet Distance [209],
denoted as FD ratio, to evaluate the distinguishability of a feature representation across
classes. The larger the ratio, the more distinguishable the feature representation across
sources. We compare our fingerprint features to image inception features [7]. The FD
of inception features is also known as FID for GAN evaluation [118]. Therefore, the
FD ratio of inception features can serve as a reference to show how challenging it is to
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(a) CelebA real data
(b) ProGAN (c) SNGAN (d) CramerGAN (e) MMDGAN
Figure 4.4: Face samples from difference sources.
attribute high-quality GAN-generated images manually or without fingerprint learning.
4.4.2 Existence and uniqueness: which GAN parameters differentiate
image attribution?
We consider GAN architecture, training set, and initialization seed respectively by
varying one type of parameter and keeping the other two fixed.
Different architectures. First, we leverage all the real images to train ProGAN,
SNGAN, CramerGAN, and MMDGAN separately. For the classification task, we configure
training and testing sets with 5 classes: {real, ProGAN, SNGAN, CramerGAN, MMDGAN}.
We randomly collect 100, 000 images from each source for classification training and
another 10, 000 images from each source for testing. We show face samples from each
source in Figure 4.4. Table 4.1 shows that we can effectively differentiate GAN-generated
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images from real ones and attribute generated images to their sources, just using a regular
CNN classifier. There do exist unique fingerprints in images that differentiate GAN
architectures, even though it is far more challenging to attribute those images manually
or through inception features [7].
Different GAN training sets. We further narrow down the investigation to GAN
training sets. From now we only focus on ProGAN plus real dataset. We first randomly
select a base real subset containing 100, 000 images, denoted as real subset diff 0. We
then randomly select 10 other real subsets also containing 100, 000 images, denoted as
real subset diff #i, where i ∈ {1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000, 20000, 40000, 60000, 80000,
100000} indicates the number of images that are not from the base subset. We collect
such sets of datasets to explore the relationship between attribution performance and GAN
training set overlaps.
For each real subset diff #i, we separately train a ProGAN model and query 100, 000
images for classifier training and another 10, 000 images for testing, labeled as ProGAN subset diff #i.
In this setup of {real, ProGAN subset diff #i}, we show the performance evaluation
in Table 4.2. Surprisingly, we find that attribution performance remains equally high
regardless of the amount of GAN training set overlap. Even GAN training sets that differ
in just one image can lead to distinct GAN instances. That indicates that one-image
mismatch during GAN training results in a different optimization step in one iteration
and finally results in distinct fingerprints. That motivates us to investigate the attribution
performance among GAN instances that were trained with identical architecture and
dataset but with different random initialization seeds.




Accuracy Eigenface [208] 53.28 -
(%) PRNU [189] 86.61 67.84
Ours 99.43 98.58
FD ratio Inception [7] 2.36 5.27
Our fingerprint 454.76 226.59
Table 4.1: Evaluation on {real, ProGAN, SNGAN, CramerGAN, MMDGAN}. The best
performance is highlighted in bold.
CelebA LSUN
kNN 11.46 10.72
Accuracy Eigenface [208] 27.98 -
(%) PRNU [189] 92.28 70.55
Ours 99.50 97.66
FD ratio Inception [7] 1.08 1.64
Our fingerprint 111.41 39.96
Table 4.2: Evaluation on {real, ProGAN subset diff #i}. The best performance is
highlighted in bold.
initialization on image attributability. We train 10 ProGAN instances with the entire real
dataset and with different initialization seeds. We sample 100, 000 images for classifier
training and another 10, 000 images for testing. In this setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}
where i ∈ {1, ..., 10}, we show the performance evaluation in Table 4.3. We conclude
that it is the difference in optimization (e.g., caused by different randomness) that leads
to attributable fingerprints. In order to verify our experimental setup, we ran sanity
checks. For example, two identical ProGAN instances trained with the same seed remain




Accuracy Eigenface [208] 23.12 -
(%) PRNU [189] 89.40 69.73
Ours 99.14 97.04
Our visNet 97.07 96.58
FD ratio Inception [7] 1.10 1.29
Our fingerprint 80.28 36.48
Table 4.3: Evaluation on {real, ProGAN seed v#i}. The best performance is highlighted
in bold. “Our visNet” row indicates our fingerprint visualization network described in
Section 4.3.2 and evaluated in Section 4.4.5.
4.4.3 Persistence: which image components contain fingerprints for attribution?
We systematically explore attribution performance w.r.t. image components in
different frequency bands or with different patch sizes. We also investigate possible
performance bias from GAN artifacts.
Different frequencies. We investigate if band-limited images carry effective fingerprints
for attribution. We separately apply the proposed pre-downsampling network and pre-
downsampling residual network for image attribution. Given the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i},
Table 4.4 shows the classification accuracy w.r.t. downsampling factors. We conclude that
(1) a wider frequency band carries more fingerprint information for image attribution,
(2) the low-frequency and high-frequency components (even at the resolution of 8 ×
8) individually carry effective fingerprints and result in attribution performance better
than random, and (3) at the same resolution, high-frequency components carry more
fingerprint information than low-frequency components.
Different local patch sizes. We also investigate if local image patches carry effective
fingerprints for attribution. We apply the post-pooling network for image attribution.
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Downsample Res- CelebA LSUN
factor olution L-f H-f L-f H-f
1 1282 99.14 99.14 97.04 97.04
2 642 98.74 98.64 96.78 96.84
4 322 95.50 98.52 91.08 96.04
8 162 87.20 92.90 83.02 91.58
16 82 67.44 78.74 63.80 80.58
32 42 26.58 48.42 28.24 54.50
Table 4.4: Classification accuracy (%) of our network w.r.t. downsampling factor on low-
frequency or high-frequency components of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}. “L-f” column
indicates the low-frequency components and represents the performances from the pre-
downsampling network. “H-f” column indicates the high-frequency components and
represents the performances from the pre-downsampling residual network.
Pooling starts at Patch size CelebA LSUN
42 1282 99.34 97.44
82 1082 99.32 96.30
162 522 99.30 95.94
322 242 99.24 88.36
642 102 89.60 18.26
1282 32 13.42 17.10
Table 4.5: Classification accuracy (%) of our network w.r.t. patch size on {real,
ProGAN seed v#i}.
Given the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}, Table 4.5 shows the classification accuracy
w.r.t. patch sizes. We conclude that for CelebA face dataset a patch of size 24×24 or larger
carries sufficient fingerprint information for image attribution without deterioration; for
LSUN, a patch of size 52× 52 or larger carries a sufficient fingerprint.
Artifact-free subset. Throughout our experiments, the state-of-the-art GAN approaches
are capable of generating high-quality images – but are also generating obvious artifacts
in some cases. There is a concern that attribution might be biased by such artifacts. In
order to eliminate this concern, we use Perceptual Similariy [8] to measure the 1-nearest-
neighbor similarity between each testing generated image and the real-world dataset, and
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(a) Non-selected samples (b) Selected samples
Figure 4.5: Visual comparisons between (a) arbitrary face samples and (b) selected
samples with top 10% Perceptual Similarity [8] to CelebA real dataset. We notice the
selected samples have higher quality and fewer artifacts. They are also more similar to
each other, which challenge more on attribution.
then select the 10% with the highest similarity for attribution. We compare face samples
between non-selected and selected sets in Figure 4.5. We notice this metric is visually
effective in selecting samples of higher quality and with fewer artifacts.
Given the setup of 10% selected {real, ProGAN seed v#i}, we show the performance
evaluation in Table 4.6. All the FD ratio measures consistently decreased compared to
Table 4.3. This indicates our selection also moves the image distributions from different
GAN instances closer to the real dataset and consequently closer to each other. This
makes the attribution task more challenging. Encouragingly, our classifier, pre-trained on
non-selected images, can perform equally well on the selected high-quality images and is
hence not biased by artifacts.
4.4.4 Immunizability: how robust is attribution to image perturbation
attacks and how effective are the defenses?
Attacks. We apply five types of attacks that perturb testing images [210]: noise,




Accuracy Eigenface [208] 26.69 -
(%) PRNU [189] 93.50 74.49
Ours 99.93 98.16
FD ratio Inception [7] 1.04 1.22
Our fingerprint 15.63 6.27
Table 4.6: Evaluation on the 10% selected images of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}. The best
performance is highlighted in bold.
intention is to confuse the attribution network by destroying image fingerprints. Examples
of the perturbations on face images are shown in Figure 4.6.
Noise adds i.i.d. Gaussian noise to testing images. The Gaussian variance is
randomly sampled from U [5.0, 20.0]. Blur performs Gaussian filtering on testing images
with kernel size randomly picked from {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}. Cropping crops testing images
with a random offset between 5% and 20% of the image side lengths and then resizes
back to the original. JPEG compression performs JPEG compression processing with
quality factor randomly sampled from U [10, 75]. Relighting uses SfSNet [211] to replace
the current image lighting condition with another random one from their lighting dataset.
The combination performs each attack with a 50% probability in the order of relighting,
cropping, blur, JPEG compression, and noise.
Given perturbed images and the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}, we show the
pre-trained classifier performances in the “Akt” columns in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. All
performances decrease due to attacks. In detail, the classifier completely fails to overcome
noise and JPEG compression attacks. It still performs better than random when facing the
other four types of attacks. The relighting attack is the least effective one because it only
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(a) No attack (b) Noise (c) Blur (d) Cropping
(e) Compression (f) Relighting (g) Combination
Figure 4.6: Image samples for the attacks and defenses of our attribution network.
perturbs low-frequency image components. The barely unchanged fingerprints in high-
frequency components enables reasonable attribution.
Defenses. In order to immunize our classifier against attacks, we finetune the
classifier under the assumption that we know the attack category. Given perturbed images
and the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}, we show the finetuned classifier performance
in the “Dfs” columns in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. It turns out that the immunized classifier
completely regains performance over blur, cropping and relighting attacks, and partially
regains performance over the others. However, the recovery from combination attack is
minimal due to its highest complexity. In addition, our method consistently outperforms
the method of Marra [189] under each attack after immunization, while theirs does not
effectively benefit from such immunization.
72
CelebA
Noise Blur Cropping Compression Relighting Combination
Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs
PRNU [189] 57.88 63.82 27.37 42.43 9.84 10.68 26.15 44.55 86.59 87.02 19.93 21.77
Ours 9.14 93.02 49.64 97.20 46.80 98.28 8.77 88.02 94.02 98.66 19.31 72.64
Table 4.7: Classification accuracy (%) of our network w.r.t. different perturbation attacks
before or after immunization on CelebA {real, ProGAN seed v#i}. The best performance
is highlighted in bold.
LSUN
Noise Blur Cropping Compression Relighting Combination
Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs Atk Dfs
PRNU [189] 39.59 40.97 26.92 30.79 9.30 9.42 18.27 23.66 60.86 63.31 16.54 16.89
Ours 11.80 95.30 74.48 96.68 86.20 97.30 24.73 92.40 62.21 97.36 24.44 83.42
Table 4.8: Classification accuracy (%) of our network w.r.t. different perturbation attacks
before or after immunization on LSUN bedroom {real, ProGAN seed v#i}. The best
performance is highlighted in bold.
4.4.5 Fingerprint visualization
Given the setup of {real, ProGAN seed v#i}, we alternatively apply the fingerprint
visualization network (Section 4.3.2) to attribute images. We show the attribution performance
in the “Our visNet” row in Table 4.3, which are comparable to that of the attribution
model. Figure 4.7 visualizes face fingerprints. It turns out that image fingerprints maximize
responses only to their own model fingerprints, which supports effective attribution. To
attribute the real-world image, it is sufficient for the fingerprint to focus only on the eyes.
To attribute the other images, the fingerprints also consider clues from the background,
which, compared to foreground faces, is more variant and harder for GANs to approximate
realistically [212].
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Figure 4.7: Visualization of model and image fingerprint samples. Their pairwise
interactions are shown as the confusion matrix.
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4.5 Conclusion
We have presented the first study of learning GAN fingerprints towards image
attribution. Our experiments show that even a small difference in GAN training (e.g., the
difference in initialization) can leave a distinct fingerprint that commonly exists over all
its generated images. That enables fine-grained image attribution and model attribution.
Further encouragingly, fingerprints are persistent across different frequencies and different
patch sizes, and are not biased by GAN artifacts. Even though fingerprints can be deteriorated
by several image perturbation attacks, they are effectively immunizable by simple finetuning.
Comparisons also show that, in a variety of conditions, our learned fingerprints are consistently
superior to the very recent baseline [189] for attribution, and consistently outperform
inception features [7] for cross-source distinguishability.
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Chapter 5: Artificial Fingerprinting for Generative Models: Rooting Deepfake
Attribution in Training Data
5.1 Introduction
In the past years, photorealistic image generation has been rapidly evolving, benefiting
from the invention of generative adversarial networks (GANs) [9] and its successive
breakthroughs [10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Given the level of realism and diversity
that generative models can achieve today, detecting generated media, well known as
deepfakes, attributing their sources, and tracing their legal responsibilities become infeasible
to human beings.
Moreover, the misuse of deepfakes has been permeating to each corner of social
media, ranging from misinformation of political campaigns [213] to fake journalism [214,
215]. This motivates tremendous research efforts on deepfake detection [216] and source
attribution [1, 2, 189]. These techniques aim to counter the widespread of malicious
applications of deepfakes by automatically identifying and flagging generated visual contents
and tracking their sources. Most of them rely on low-level visual patterns in GAN-
generated images [1, 2, 189] or frequency mismatch [217, 218, 219]. However, these
techniques are unable to sustainably and robustly prevent deepfake misuse in the long run;
76
Figure 5.1: Our solution pipeline consists of four stages. We first train an image
steganography encoder and decoder. Then we use the encoder to embed artificial
fingerprints into the training data. After that, we train a generative model with its original
protocol. Finally, we decode the fingerprints from the generated deepfakes.
as generative models evolve, they learn to better match the true distribution causing fewer
artifacts [216]. Besides, detection countermeasures are also continuously evolving [216,
220, 221].
Motivated by this, we tackle deepfake detection and attribution through a different
lens, and propose a proactive and sustainable solution for detection, which is simple and
effective. In specific, we aim to introduce artificial fingerprints into generative models
that enable identification and tracing. Figure 7.1 depicts our pipeline; we first embed
artificial fingerprints into the training data using image steganography [222, 223]. The
generative model is then trained with its original protocol without modification. This
makes our solution agnostic and plug-and-play for arbitrary models. We then show a
surprising discovery on the transferability of such fingerprints from training data to the
model: the same fingerprint information that was encoded in the training data can be
decoded from all generated images.
We achieve deepfake detection by classifying images with matched fingerprints
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in our database as fake and images with random detected fingerprints as real. We also
achieve deepfake attribution when we allocate different fingerprints for different generative
models. Our solution thus closes the responsibility loop between generative model inventions
and their possible misuses. It prevents the misuse of published pre-trained generative
models by enabling inventors to proactively and responsibly embed artificial fingerprints
into the models.
We summarize our contributions as follow:
(1) We synergize the two previously uncorrelated domains, image steganography
and GANs, and propose the first proactive and sustainable solution for the third emerging
domain, deepfake detection and attribution.
(2) This is the first study to demonstrate the transferability of artificial fingerprints
from training data to generative models and then to all the generated deepfakes. Our
discovery is non-trivial: only deep-learning-based fingerprinting techniques [222, 223]
are transferable to generative models, while conventional steganography and watermarking
techniques [224, 225] are not. See Section 5.5.2 for comparisons.
(3) We empirically validate several beneficial properties of our solution. Universality
(Section 5.5.2): it holds for a variety of cutting-edge generative models [14, 15, 16,
17, 226]. Fidelity (Section 5.5.3): it has a negligible side effect on generation quality.
Robustness (Section 5.5.4): it stays robust against many perturbations. Secrecy (Section 5.5.5):
the artificial fingerprints are hard to be detected by adversaries. Anti-deepfake (Section 5.5.6
and 5.5.7): it converts deepfake detection and attribution into trivial tasks and outperforms
the state-of-the-art baselines [1, 2].
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5.2 Related Work
Generative adversarial networks (GANs). GANs [9] was first proposed as a
workaround to model the intractable real data distribution. The iterative improvements
push the generation realism to brand-new levels [10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Successes
have also spread to many other vision tasks (e.g. [5, 29, 30, 31, 34, 37, 226]). In Section 5.5,
we focus on three categories of cutting-edge generative models: unconditional (ProGAN [15],
StyleGAN [16], and StyleGAN2 [17]), class-conditional (BigGAN [14]), and image-
conditional (image-to-image translation) (CUT [226]).
Image steganography and watermarking. Image steganography and watermarking
hide information into carrier images [227]. Previous techniques rely on Fourier transform [228,
229], JPEG compression [224, 225], or least significant bits modification [230, 231, 232].
Recent works replace hand-crafted hiding procedures with neural network encoding [222,
223, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237]. We leverage recent deep-learning-based steganography
methods [222, 223] to embed artificial fingerprints into training data, and validate their
transferability to generative models. This is non-trivial because only deep-learning-based
fingerprints are transferable to generative models, while conventional ones [224, 225] are
not (Section 5.5.2). Besides, the stealthiness achieved by steganography allows preserving
the original generation quality (Section 5.5.3) and fingerprint secrecy (Section 5.5.5).
Our fingerprinting is conceptually and functionally orthogonal to all of them. Instead
of encoding information into pixels of individual images, our solution encodes information
into generator parameters such that all the generated images are entangled with that
information. Compared to the pipeline of a generator followed by a watermarking module,
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our solution introduces zero generation overheads, and obstructs adversarial model surgery
that targets to detach watermarking from image generation.
Network watermarking. Different from image watermarking, network watermarking
targets to hide information into model parameters without affecting its original performances,
similar in spirit to our goal. There are two categories of them: black-box trigger-set-based
solutions [184, 238], and white-box feature-based solutions [185, 239, 240]. The former
ones embed watermarks through a trigger set of input and decodes watermarks according
to the input-output behavior of the model. The latter ones directly embed watermarks
in the model parameter space with transformation matrices. It is worth noting that our
solution renders conceptual and technical distinctions from network watermarking. In
terms of concepts, the previous works target to only discriminative models (e.g., classification),
while a solution for generative models is urgently lacking. In terms of techniques, to adapt
to generator watermarking, we tune our solution to indirectly transfers fingerprints from
training data to model parameters. This is because (1) unconditional generative models do
not allow deterministic input so that a trigger set is not applicable, and (2) transformations
in the parameter space are not agnostic to model configurations so that they are neither
scalable nor sustainable along with the evolution of generative models.
Deepfake detection and attribution. Images generated by GAN models bear
unique patterns. [189] shows that generative models leave unique noise residuals to
generated samples, which allows deepfake detection. [2] moves one step further, using
a neural network classifier to attribute different images to their sources. [1] also train
a classifier and improve the generalization across different generation techniques. [217,
218, 220] point out that the high-frequency pattern mismatch can be used for deepfake
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detection, so can the texture feature mismatch [241]. However, these cues are not sustainable
due to the advancement of detection countermeasures. For example, spectral regularization [220]
is proposed to narrow down the frequency mismatch and results in a significant detection
deterioration. Also, detectors [1] are vulnerable to adversarial evasion attacks [221].
In contrast to the previous passive approaches, we propose a novel proactive solution
for model fingerprinting and, thus, for deepfake detection. We differentiate between our
term artificial fingerprints which refers to the information we deliberately and proactively
embed into the model, and the term GAN fingerprints [2] which refers to the inherent
cues and artifacts of different GAN models. Our work is also distinct from a follow-up
proactive technique [242]. They focus on fingerprinting scalability and efficiency while
we focus more fundamentally on its transferability and universality.
5.3 Problem Statement
Generation techniques can be misused to create misinformation at scale to achieve
financial or political gains. Recently, there have been concerns about releasing generative
models. For example, OpenAI employed a staged release to evaluate the potential risks
of their GPT-2 model [243]. GPT-3 was later released as a black-box API only [244].
Face2Face [160] authors did not open their sources for real-time face capture and reenactment.
We design solution from the model inventors’ side (e.g., OpenAI). Our solution
introduces traceable artificial fingerprints in generative models. It enables deepfake detection
and attribution by decoding the fingerprints from the generated images and matching
them to the known fingerprints given to different models. This equips model inventors
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with a means for a proactive and responsible disclosure when publishing their pre-trained
models. This distinguishes our model fingerprinting solution from watermarking the
generated images: we aim to defend against the misuse of published generative models
rather than single deepfake media.
In practice, the training is done by the model inventor. Responsible model inventors,
different from malicious deepfake users, should be eager/willing to adopt a proactive
solution to fingerprint their generative models against potential deepfake misuses. The
fingerprinting encoder and decoder, and the unique fingerprints given to different models,
are privately maintained by the model inventor. Once a deepfake misuse happens, the
inventor is able to verify if this is generated by one of their models. If so, they can further
attribute by which model user. Then they can prohibit that user’s accessibility to the
model and/or seek legal regulations. Thus, they can claim responsible disclosure with a
countermeasure against potential misuse when they publish their models.
5.4 Artificial Fingerprints
The goal of image attribution is to learn a mappingD0(x) 7→ y that traces the source
y ∈ Y = {real,G1, . . . ,GN} of an image x. If the domain Y is limited, predefined, and
known to us, this is a closed-world scenario and the attribution can be simply formulated
as a multi-label classification problem, each label corresponding to one source, as conducted
in [2]. However, Y can be unlimited, undefined, continuously evolving, and agnostic to
us. This open-world scenario is intractable using discriminative learning. To generalize
our solution to being agnostic to the selection of generative models, we formulate the
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attribution as a regression mapping D(x) 7→ w, where w ∈ {0, 1}n is the source identity
space and n is the dimension. We propose a pipeline to root the attribution down to the
training dataset x̃ ∈ X̃ and close the loop of the regression D. We describe the pipeline
stages (depicted in Figure 7.1) below:
Steganography training. The source identity is represented by the artificial fingerprints
w. We use a steganography system [222, 223] to learn an encoder E(x̃,w) 7→ x̃w that
embeds an arbitrary fingerprint w (randomly sampled during training) into an arbitrary
image x̃. We couple E with a decoder D(x̃w) 7→ w to detect the fingerprint information











wk log ŵk + (1−wk) log(1− ŵk)
)
(5.2)






where wk and ŵk are the kth bit of the input fingerprint and detected fingerprint separately;
and λ is a hyper-parameter to balance the two objective terms. The binary cross-entropy
term LBCE guides the decoder to decode the fingerprint embedded by the encoder. The
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mean squared error term LMSE penalizes any deviation of the stego image E(x̃,w) from
the original image x̃.
Artificial fingerprint embedding. In this stage, we use the well trained E and
D networks. We allocate each training dataset X̃ a unique fingerprint w. We apply the
trained E to each training image x̃ and collect a fingerprinted training dataset X̃w =
{E(x̃,w)|x̃ ∈ X̃}.
Generative model training. In order to have a solution that is agnostic to the
evolution of generative models, we intentionally do not intervene with their training. It
makes our solution plug-and-play for arbitrary generation tasks without touching their
implementations, and introduces zero overhead to model training. We simply replace X̃
with X̃w to train the generative model in its original protocol.
Artificial fingerprint decoding. We hypothesize the transferability of our artificial
fingerprints from training data to generative models: a well-trained generator Gw(z) 7→
xw contains, in all generated images, the same fingerprint information w (as embedded
in the training data x̃w). We justify this hypothesis in Section 5.5.2. As a result, the
artificial fingerprint can be recovered from a generated image xw using the decoder D:
D(xw) ≡ w. Based on this transferability, we can formulate deepfake attribution as
fingerprint matching using our decoder D.
Artificial fingerprint matching. To support robustness to post-generation modifications
that could be applied to the generated images, we relax the matching of the decoded
artificial fingerprints to a soft matching. We perform a null hypothesis test given the
number of matching bits k between the decoded fingerprint w̃ and the fingerprint w used
in generative model training. The null hypothesis H0 is getting this number of successes
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(i.e. matching bits) by chance. Under the null hypothesis, the probability of matching bits
(random variable X) follows a binomial distribution: the number of trials n is the number
of bits in the fingerprint sequence, and k is the number of successes where each bit has
a 0.5 probability of success. We can then measure the p-value of the hypothesis test by
computing the probability of getting k or higher matching bits under the null hypothesis:








The fingerprint is verified, w̃ ∼ w, if the null hypothesis results in a very low probability
(p-value). Usually, when the p-value is smaller than 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis
and regard 1− p as the verification confidence.
5.5 Experiments
We describe the experimental setup in Section 7.4.1. We first evaluate the required
proprieties of our solution: the transferability and universality of our artificial fingerprint
in Section 5.5.2, its fidelity in Section 5.5.3, its robustness in Section 5.5.4, and its secrecy
in Section 5.5.5. The transferability in turn enables accurate deepfake detection and
attribution, which is evaluated and compared in Section 5.5.6 and 5.5.7 respectively.
5.5.1 Setup
Generative models. As a proactive solution, it should be agnostic to genetative
models. Without losing representativeness, we focus on three generation applications
with their state-of-the-art models. For unconditional generation: ProGAN [15], StyleGAN [16],
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and StyleGAN2 [17]; for class-conditional generation: BigGAN [14]; for image-conditional
generation, i.e., image-to-image translation: CUT [226]. Each model is trained from
scratch with the official implementation.
Datasets. Each generation application benchmarks its own datasets. For unconditional
generation, we train/test on 150k/50k CelebA [206] at 128×128 resolution, 50k/50k
LSUN Bedroom [207] at 128×128 resolution, and the most challenging one, 50k/50k
LSUN Cat [207] at its original 256×256 resolution. For class-conditional generation,
we experiment on the entire CIFAR-10 dataset [245] with the original training/testing
split at the original 32×32 resolution. For image-conditional generation, we experiment
on the entire Horse→Zebra dataset [30] and Cat→Dog [45] dataset with the original
training/testing split at the original 256×256 resolution. We only need to fingerprint
images from the target domains.
5.5.2 Transferability
The transferability means that the artificial fingerprints that are embedded in the
training data also appear consistently in all the generated data. This is a non-trivial
hypothesis in Section 5.4 and needs to be justified by the fingerprint detection accuracy.
Evaluation. Fingerprints are represented as binary vectors w ∈ {0, 1}n. We use
bitwise accuracy to evaluate the detection accuracy. We set n = 100 as suggested in [223].
We also report p-value for the confidence of detection.
Baselines. For comparison, we implement a straightforward baseline method. Instead
of embedding fingerprints into training data, we enforce fingerprint generation jointly
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with model training. That is, we train on clean data, and enforce generated images to not








where G and Dis are the original generator and discriminator in the GAN framework,
Ladv is the original GAN objective, and LBCE is adapted from Eq. 5.2 where we replace
ŵ = D(E(x̃,w)) with ŵ = D(G(z)). η is set to 1.0 as a hyper-parameter to balance the
two objective terms.
We also compare the deep-learning-based steganography technique used in our
solution ([223]) to two well-established, non-deep learning steganographic methods [224,
225] that alter the frequency coefficients of JPEG compression.
Results. We report the fingerprint detection performance in Table 5.1 fourth and
fifth columns. We observe:
(1) The “Data” row shows the detection accuracy on real testing images for sanity
checks: it reaches the 100% saturated accuracy, indicating the effectiveness of the steganography
technique by its nature.
(2) Our artificial fingerprints can be almost perfectly and confidently detected from
generated images over a variety of applications, generative models, and datasets. The
accuracy is ≥ 0.98 except for ProGAN on LSUN Bedroom, but its 0.93 accuracy and
10−19 p-value are far sufficient to verify the presence of fingerprints. Our hypothesis
on the transferability from training data to generative models (i.e. generated data) is
therefore justified. As a result, artificial fingerprints are qualified for deepfake detection
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 5.2: CelebA samples at 128×128 for Table 5.1 last two columns. (a) Original real
training samples. (b) Fingerprinted real training samples. (c) The difference between (a)
and (b), 10× magnified for easier visualization. (d) Samples from the non-fingerprinted
ProGAN. (e) Samples from the fingerprinted ProGAN.
and attribution.
(3) The universality of fingerprint transferability over varying tasks and models
validates our solution is agnostic to generative model techniques.
(4) The baseline of joint fingerprinting and generation training (first row) is also
moderately effective in terms of fingerprint detection, but we show in Section 5.5.3 it
leads to strong deterioration of generation quality.
(5) Conventional steganography methods [224, 225] (second and third rows) do
not transfer hidden information into models, indicated by the random guess performance
during decoding. We attribute this to the discrepancy between deep generation techniques
and shallow steganography techniques. We reason that generative models leverage deep
discriminators to approximate common image patterns including low-level fingerprints.
Only comparably deep-learning-based fingerprinting techniques, e.g. [223], are compatible
to hide and transfer fingerprints to the models, while hand-crafted image processing is not
effective. Therefore, the transferability of our fingerprinting is non-trivial.
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Fgpt Bit Orig Fgpt
Dataset tech Model acc ⇑ p-value FID FID ⇓
CelebA
Eq. 5.6 ProGAN 0.93 < 10−19 14.09 60.28
[224] StyleGAN2 0.51 0.46 6.41 6.93
[225] StyleGAN2 0.53 0.31 6.41 6.82
[223] Data 1.00 - - 1.15
[223] ProGAN 0.98 < 10−26 14.09 14.38
[223] StyleGAN 0.99 < 10−28 8.98 9.72
[223] StyleGAN2 0.99 < 10−28 6.41 6.23
LSUN
[223] ProGAN 0.93 < 10−19 29.16 32.58
[223] StyleGAN 0.98 < 10−26 24.95 25.71
Bedroom [223] StyleGAN2 0.99 < 10−28 13.92 14.71
LSUN
[223] ProGAN 0.98 < 10−26 45.22 48.97
[223] StyleGAN 0.99 < 10−28 33.45 34.01
Cat [223] StyleGAN2 0.99 < 10−28 31.01 32.60
CIFAR-10 [223] BigGAN 0.99 < 10−28 6.25 6.80
Horse→Zebra [223] CUT 0.99 < 10−28 22.98 23.43
Cat→Dog [223] CUT 0.99 < 10−28 55.78 56.09
Table 5.1: Artificial fingerprint detection in bitwise accuracy (⇑ indicates higher is better)
and generation quality in FID (⇓ indicates lower is better). The “Data” row corresponds to
real testing images for a sanity check. The “Orig FID” column corresponds to the original
(non-fingerprinted) models for references. The first three rows are the baselines.
5.5.3 Fidelity
The fidelity of generated images is as critical as the transferability. Fingerprinting
should have a negligible side effect on the functionality of generative models. This
preserves the original generation quality and avoids the adversary’s suspect of the presence
of fingerprints. The steganography technique we used should enable this, which we
validate empirically.
Evaluation. We use Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) [118] to evaluate the generation
quality; the lower, the more realistic. We measure FID between a set of 50k generated
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images and a set of 50k real non-fingerprinted images, in order to evaluate the quality
of the generated set. When calculating different FIDs for each dataset, the real set is
unchanged.
Results. We compare the generation quality of original and fingerprinted generative
models in Table 5.1 sixth and seventh columns. We observe:
(1) The “Data” rows are for sanity checks: embedding fingerprints into real images
does not substantially deteriorate image quality: FID ≤ 1.15 is in an excellent realism
range. This validates the secrecy of the steganographic technique and lays a valid foundation
for high-quality model training.
(2) For a variety of settings, the performance of the fingerprinted generative models
tightly sticks to the original limits of their non-fingerprinted baselines. The heaviest
deterioration is as small as +3.75 FID happening for ProGAN on LSUN Cat. In practice,
the generated fingerprints are imperceptibly hidden in the generated images and can only
be perceived under 10× magnification. See Figure 5.2 for demonstrations. Therefore,
the fidelity of fingerprinted models is justified and it qualifies our solution for deepfake
detection and attribution.
(3) The baseline of joint fingerprinting and generation training (first row) deteriorates
generation quality remarkably. This indicates model fingerprinting is a non-trivial task:
direct fingerprint reconstruction distracts adversarial training. In contrast, our solution
leverages image steganography and fingerprint transferability, sidesteps this issue, and
leads to better performance.
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5.5.4 Robustness
Deepfake media and generative models may undergo post-processing or perturbations
during broadcasts. We validate the robustness of our fingerprint detection given a variety
of image and model perturbations, and investigate the corresponding working ranges.
Perturbations. We evaluate the robustness against four types of image perturbation:
additive Gaussian noise, blurring with Gaussian kernel, JPEG compression, center cropping.
We also evaluate the robustness against two types of model perturbations: model weight
quantization and adding Gaussian noise to model weights. For quantization, we compress
each model weight given a decimal precision. We vary the amount of perturbations, apply
each to the generated images or to the model directly, and detect the fingerprint using the
pre-trained decoder.
Results. We evaluate the artificial fingerprint detection over 50k images from a
fingerprinted ProGAN. We plot the bitwise accuracy w.r.t. the amount of perturbations in
Figure 5.3. We observe:
(1) For all the image perturbations, fingerprint detection accuracy drops monotonously
as we increase the amount of perturbation, while for small perturbations accuracy drops
rather slowly. We consider accepting accuracy ≥ 75% as a threshold (p-value = 2.8 ×
10−7). This results in the working range w.r.t. each perturbation: Gaussian noise standard
deviation ∼ [0.0, 0.05], Gaussian blur kernel size ∼ [0, 5], JPEG compression quality
∼ [50, 100], center cropping size ∼ [86, 128], quantization decimal precision ≤ 10−1,
and model noise standard deviation ∼ [0.0, 0.18], which are reasonably wide ranges in
practice.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 5.3: Red plots show the artificial fingerprint detection in bitwise accuracy w.r.t. the
amount of perturbations over ProGAN trained on CelebA. In the left four plots (robustness
against image perturbations), blue dots represent detection accuracy on the fingerprinted
real training images, which serve as the upper bound references for the red dots. In the
right two plots (robustness against model perturbations), blue dots represent the FID of
generated images from the perturbed models.
(2) For image perturbations (the left four subplots) outside the above working ranges,
the reference upper bounds drop even faster and the margins to the testing curves shrink
quickly, indicating that the detection deterioration is irrelevant to model training but rather
relevant to the heavy quality deterioration of training images.
(3) For model perturbations (the right two subplots) outside the above working
ranges, image quality deteriorates faster than fingerprint accuracy: even before the accuracy
gets lower than 75%, FID has already increased by > 500%.
(4) As a result of (2) and (3), before fingerprint detection degenerates close to
random guess (∼ 50% accuracy), image quality has been heavily deteriorated by strong
perturbations (Figure 5.4), which indicates that our fingerprints are more robust than





























Figure 5.4: Perturbed image samples from the fingerprinted ProGAN and the
corresponding fingerprint detection accuracy. The detection still performs robustly
(bitwise accuracy ≥ 0.75) even when the image quality heavily deteriorates.
Discussion on attacks. Other attacks that require training counter models might be
conceivable. For example, to train a model that removes the fingerprints from generated
images (e.g. a denoising autoencoder). However, this would require attackers to have
paired training images before and after the fingerprint embedding. In our scenario, we




The presence of a fingerprint embedded in a generative model should not be easily
detected by a third party, otherwise, it would be potentially manipulated.
Attack. In order to quantify the secrecy, we formulate it as a binary classification
problem: the presence of a fingerprint in an image. We follow the attack protocol in [235]
to perform the Artificial Training Sets (ATS) attack [246]. We aim to classify between
fingerprinted and non-fingerprinted test images, but we have no supervision. The intuition
is to train another steganography encoder to expand the test set and establish an artificial
setting with known labels which enables supervised training. The original test class space
is now a subspace of the artificial training class space and is separable by the training task.
The attack is as follows: We independently train another steganography encoder.
We consider the original test images as negative training samples. Then, we apply the
encoder twice to the test set to obtain extra images fingerprinted 2 times (corresponding to
originally non-fingerprinted images) or 3 times (corresponding to originally fingerprinted
images), which are regarded as positive training samples. Then we train an SVM classifier [247]
using such positive and negative samples, in order to separate between images fingerprinted
0-1 time (original set), and the ones fingerprinted 2-3 times (artificial training set).
During testing, we first apply the encoder once to the test images so that the originally
non-fingerprinted images are now fingerprinted 1 time (belonging to 0-1 class), and the
originally fingerprinted images are now fingerprinted 2 times (belonging to 2-3 class).
Then we can use the classifier to separate them and propagate the predictions back to the
original images. We evaluate the attack on a set of 250 fingerprinted deepfake images and
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250 non-fingerprinted deepfake images.
Results. The binary classification accuracy on the existence of fingerprint is 0.502
according to the ATS attack, which is close to random guess. It indicates our fingerprinting
is secret enough from being detected by adversaries who have no access to our encoder
and decoder. We reason that the steganography encoder trained from different initialization
uses different patterns to hide the fingerprint, and therefore does not couple well with
the victim encoder. This also supports our previous discussion of the importance of
keeping the encoder private to support both the secrecy and the robustness of the artificial
fingerprints.
5.5.6 Deepfake Detection
In the previous sections, we showed that our fingerprinting solution is effective in
transferring the fingerprints and meeting the other required criteria. We now discuss how
to use it for deepfake detection and attribution.
Unlike existing methods that detect intrinsic differences between the real and deepfake
classes [1, 2, 218, 220], we, standing for model inventors, propose a proactive solution
by embedding artificial fingerprints into generative models and consequently into the
generated images. In practice, responsible model inventors, different from malicious
deepfake users, should be eager/willing to do so. Then we convert the problem to verifying
if one decoded fingerprint is in our fingerprint regulation database or not. Even with a non-
perfect detection accuracy, we can still use our solution based on the null hypothesis test
in Section 5.4. We consider deepfake verification given≥ 75% (p-value = 2.8×10−7) bit
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matching. This is feasible based on two assumptions: (1) The decoded fingerprint of a real
image is random; and (2) the fingerprint capacity is large enough such that the random
fingerprint from a real image is unlikely to collide with a regulated fingerprint in the
database. The second condition is trivial to satisfy, considering we sample fingerprints
w ∈ {0, 1}n and n = 100. 2100 is a large enough capacity. Then we validate the first
assumption by the deepfake detection experiments below.
Baselines. We compare to two recent state-of-the-art CNN-based deepfake detectors [1,
2] as baselines. [2] is trained on 40k real images and 40k generated images equally
from four generative models with distinct fingerprints. We consider the open-world
scenario where disjoint generative models are used in training and testing, to challenge
the classifier’s generalization. For [1] we use the officially released model because they
already claim improved generalization across different generation techniques.
Results. We compare our solution to the two baselines on a variety of generation
applications, models, and datasets. We test on 4k real images and 4k generated images
equally from four generative models with distinct fingerprints. We report deepfake detection
accuracy in Table 6.3 fourth column. We observe:
(1) Our solution performs perfectly (100% accuracy) for all the cases, turning open-
world deepfake detection into a trivial fingerprinting detection and matching problem.
(2) [2] deteriorates to random guess (∼ 50% accuracy) because of the curse of
domain gap between training and testing models. In contrast, our solution benefits from
being agnostic to generative models. It depends only on the presence of fingerprints rather
than the discriminative cues that are overfitted during training.
(3) Our solution outperforms [1] with clear margins. In particular, [1] degenerates
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Detection Attribution








































Horse→Zebra CUT [1] 0.836 N/A
Ours 1.000 1.000
Cat→Dog CUT [1] 0.902 N/A
Ours 1.000 1.000
Table 5.2: Deepfake detection and attribution accuracy (⇑ indicates higher is better). [1]
is not applicable to the multi-source attribution scenarios in the last column.
when model techniques evolve to be more powerful (from ProGAN to StyleGAN2), or
condition on some input guidance. On the contrary, our proactive solution synergizes
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with this evolution with high fingerprint detection accuracy, and therefore, with perfect
deepfake detection accuracy.
(4) In general, although [1] generalizes better than [2], it is still subject to future
adversarial evolution of generative models, which were witnessed rapidly progressing
over the last few years. For example, [1] was effectively evaded in [221] by extremely
small perturbations. In contrast, our work offers higher sustainability in the long run
by proactively enforcing a margin between real and generated images. This requires and
enables responsible model inventors’ disclosure against potential misuses of their models.
5.5.7 Deepfake Attribution
The goal of attribution is to trace the model source that generated a deepfake. It
upgrades the binary classification in detection to multi-class classification. Our artificial
fingerprint solution can be easily extended for attribution and enable us, standing for
model inventors, to attribute responsibility to our users when misuses occur.
Baseline. [1] is not applicable to multi-source attribution. We only compare to
[2] in the open-world scenario, i.e., the training and testing sets of generative models are
not fully overlapping. Given 40k generated images equally from four generative models
with distinct fingerprints, we use [2] to train four one-vs-all-the-others binary classifiers.
During testing, all four classifiers are applied to an image. We assign the image to the
class with the highest confidence if not all the classifiers reject that image. Otherwise, it
is assigned to the unknown label.
Results. We compare our solution to [2] on CelebA and LSUN Bedroom. We test
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on 4k/4k generated images equally from four model sources that are in/out of the training
set of [2]. We report deepfake attribution accuracy in Table 6.3 last column. We obtain
the same discoveries and conclusions as those of deepfake detection in Section 5.5.6. The
open-world attribution deteriorates for the CNN classifier [2] while our fingerprinting
solution maintains the perfect (100%) accuracy.
5.6 Conclusion
Detecting deepfakes is a complex problem due to the rapid development of generative
models and the possible adversarial countermeasure techniques. For the sake of sustainability,
we investigate a proactive solution on the model inventors’ side to make deepfake detection
agnostic to generative models. We root deepfake detection into training data, and demonstrate
the transferability of artificial fingerprints from training data to a variety of generative
models. Our empirical study shows several beneficial properties of fingerprints, including
universality, fidelity, robustness, and secrecy. Experiments demonstrate our perfect detection
and attribution accuracy that outperforms two recent state of the art. As there have been
recent concerns about the release of powerful generative techniques, our solution closes
the responsibility loop between publishing pre-trained generative model inventions and
their possible misuses. It opens up possibilities for inventors’ responsibility disclosure by
allocating each model a unique fingerprint.
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Chapter 6: Responsible Disclosure of Generative Models Using Scalable
Fingerprinting
6.1 Introduction
Over the recent five years, deep generative models have demonstrated stunning
performance in generating photorealistic images [9, 64, 248, 249], and have delivered
extensive applications ranging from low-level image postprocessing [37, 38, 39, 40, 41,
42, 43] to high-level semantic-conditioned image generation [29, 33, 34, 86, 250, 251]
and attribute editing [44, 45, 46, 47]. These successes are considerably boosted by the
revolutionary technique of generative adversarial networks (GANs) [9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17], and are closing the gap of appearances between real images and fake ones.
Despite plenty of use cases of generative models, a flood of strong concerns arise [252,
253, 254]: how can these models be misused to spoof sensors, generate deep fakes, and
enable misinformation at scale? Not only human beings have difficulties in distinguishing
deep fakes, but dedicated research efforts on deep fake detection [216, 217, 218, 219] and
attribution [1, 2, 189] are also unable to sustain longer against the evolution of generative
models. For example, researchers delve into details on how deep fake detection works,
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Figure 6.1: The diagram of our fingerprinting mechanism for generative models. Left: A
responsible model owner trains fingerprinting networks in the image generation context.
Middle: During deployment, the model owner can ad-hoc generate a large number of
fingerprinted generator instances, each corresponding to a user download. Right: The
model owner can detect fingerprints from generated images to verify and trace a user’s
deep fake misuse. This enables the owner’s responsible disclosure.
principle, any successful detector can play an auxiliary role in augmenting the discriminator
in the next iteration of GAN techniques, and consequently results in an even stronger
generator.
The dark side of deep generative models makes its industrialization process not as
straightforward as those of other artificial intelligence techniques. For example, when
commercializing the GPT-2 [243] and GPT-3 [244] models, OpenAI hesitates to open-
source the models but rather only release the black-box APIs1. They involve expensive
human labor in the loop to monitor and prevent the malicious use of the APIs. Yet still, it is
a challenging and industry-wide task on how to trace the responsibility of the downstream
use cases in an open end.
To pioneer in this task, we propose a fingerprinting mechanism to enable responsible
disclosure of deep generative models, that allows responsible researchers and companies
1https://openai.com/blog/openai-api/
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to fingerprint their models. As a result, the generated samples contain fingerprints that
can be accurately detected and attributed to their sources. This is achieved by an efficient
and scalable ad-hoc generation of a large population of models with distinct fingerprints.
See Figure 7.1 Middle.
Similar in the spirit of the dynamic filter networks [79] and style-based generator
architectures [16, 17] where their network filters are not freely learned but conditioned
on an input, we regulate to parameterize a unique fingerprint into the filters of each
generator instance. The core gist is to incorporate a fingerprint auto-encoder into a
GAN framework while preserving the original generation performance. See Figure 7.1
Left. In particular, given a GAN backbone with a generator and a discriminator, we use
the fingerprint embedding from the encoder to modulate each convolutional filter of the
generator (Figure 6.2(b)), and try to decode this fingerprint from the generated images.
We jointly train the fingerprint auto-encoder and GAN with our fingerprint related losses
and the original adversarial loss. See Figure 6.2(a) for the diagram, and 6.3.2 for details.
After training, the responsible model owner is capable of fingerprinting and releasing
different generator instances to different user downloads, which are equipped with the
same generation performance but with different fingerprints. Each user download corresponds
to a unique fingerprint, which is maintained by the owner’s database. As a result, when
misuse of a model happens, the model owner can use the decoder to detect the fingerprint
from the generated images, verify it to the database, and then trace the responsibility of
the user. See Figure 7.1 Right. Based on this form of responsible disclosure, responsible
model owners, like OpenAI, have a way to mitigate adverse side effects on society when
releasing their powerful models, while at the same time should have an automatic way to
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attribute misuse.
There are several key properties of our mechanism. The efficiency to instantiate a
generator is inherently satisfied because, after training, the fingerprint encoding and filter
modulation run with little overhead. We evaluate the effectiveness of our fingerprinting
and obtain almost perfect detection accuracy. We also justify the fidelity with a negligible
side effect on the original generation quality. See Section 6.4.2. Our recommended
operation point uses a 128-bit fingerprint (Section 6.4.3) which in principle results in
more than 1036 identifiable generator instances. The scalability benefits from the fact that
fingerprints are randomly sampled on the fly during training so that fingerprint detection
generalizes well for the entire fingerprint space. See Section 6.4.4 for validation. In
addition, we validate in Section 6.4.5 the robustness and immunizability of our fingerprinting
against perturbation on generated images.
To target the initial motivation, we test our mechanism, as a proactive method, in the
deep fake detection and attribution tasks. We show in Section 6.4.6 saturated performance
and advantages over two state-of-the-art discriminative methods [1, 2] especially in the
open world. This is because, conditioned on user-specific fingerprint inputs, the presence
of such fingerprints in generated images guarantees the margin between real and fake, and
facilitates the attribution and responsibility tracing of deep fakes to their sources.
Our contributions are in four thrusts:
(1) We introduce the concept of fingerprinting for generative models that enables a
responsible disclosure of state-of-the-art GAN models.
(2) We present a novel mechanism for efficient and scalable fingerprinting GAN
models, i.e., only one generic GAN model is trained while more than 1036 identifiable
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generator instances (each with a unique fingerprint) can be obtained with little overhead
during deployment.
(3) We also justify several key properties of our fingerprinting, including effectiveness,
fidelity, large capacity, scalability, robustness, and immunizability.
(4) Finally, for the deep fake detection and attribution tasks, we validate its saturated
performance and advantages over previous learning-based discriminative methods. It
makes our responsible disclosure independent of the evolution of GAN techniques.
6.2 Related work
Generative adversarial networks (GANs). GANs [9] were invented to model real
data distribution via solving a real/fake binary classification problem, and demonstrated
stunning realism. This has triggered rapid progresses towards generating photorealistic
images in high resolution [10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Many successful generative applications
are established on them, e.g., image postprocessing [37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43], image
translation [22, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36], and image manipulation [44, 45, 46, 47].
They deliver generative modeling techniques to ordinary people and make deep fakes
popular on social media, which urges mitigation against deep fake misuse. As a response,
our fingerprinting mechanism enables responsible disclosure of generative models, and is
agnostic to their evolution and categories. We demonstrate that our method can effectively
fingerprint the state-of-the-art GAN models [17] without affecting generation quality.
Deep fake detection and attribution. These tasks come along with the increasing
concerns on deep fake misuse [252, 253, 254]. Deep fake detection is a binary classification
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problem to distinguish fake samples from real ones, while attribution further traces their
sources. The findings of visually imperceptible but machine-distinguishable patterns in
GAN-generated images make these tasks viable by noise pattern matching [189], deep
classifiers [2, 196, 255], or deep Recurrent Neural Networks [256]. [1] follows up with
a generalization of classification across different GAN techniques. [217, 218, 220, 241]
observe that mismatches between real and fake in frequency domain or in texture representation
can facilitate deep fake detection.
However, these passive detection methods heavily rely on the inherent clues in deep
fakes. Therefore, they can barely sustain a long time against the adversarial iterations of
GAN techniques. For example, [220] improves generation realism by closing the gap in
generated high-frequency components. To handle this situation, artificial fingerprinting is
proposed in [3] to proactively embed clues into generative models by rooting fingerprints
into training data. This makes deep fake detection independent of GAN evolution. Yet, as
indirect fingerprinting, [3] cannot scale up to a large number of fingerprints because they
have to pre-process training data for each individual fingerprint and re-train a generator
with each fingerprint. Our method is similar in spirit to [3], but possesses fundamental
advantages by directly fingerprinting generative models: after training one generic fingerprinting
model, we can instantiate a large number of generators ad-hoc with different fingerprints.
Image steganography and watermarking. Image steganography and watermarking
represent a technique of hiding information into carrier images [227]. Previous techniques
rely on Fourier transform [228, 229], JPEG compression [224, 225], or least significant
bits modification [230, 231, 232]. Recent works substitute hand-crafted hiding procedures
with neural network embedding [233, 234, 236] and/or generative modeling [222, 223,
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235, 237, 257, 258, 259]. Our fingerprinting is conceptually and functionally orthogonal
to steganography and watermarking. Instead of retouching pixels and encoding information
into individual images, our solution is the first study to directly modify generator parameters
and encode information into the model such that all the generated images contain the
identical hidden information. Technically, compared to the pipeline of a generator followed
by a watermarking module, our solution introduces zero generation overheads, and makes
adversarial model surgery impossible that targets to detach watermarking from image
generation.
Network watermarking. Network watermarking techniques [184, 185, 238, 239,
240] embed watermarks into network parameters rather than pixels while not deteriorating
the original utility. Our solution shares motivations with the existing works but is substantially
different in terms of concepts, motivations, and techniques. For concepts, the existing
works are applicable to only image classification models, while a solution for generative
models is missing altogether and therefore urgently needed. For motivations, the existing
works target to fingerprint a single model, while we are motivated by the limitation of [3]
to scale up the fingerprinting to as many as 1036 various generator instances within one-
time training. For techniques, the existing works embed fingerprints in the input-output
behavior of the classification model [184, 238], while our solution does not require such
trigger input because GANs do not specify its input.
Conditioned parameters in networks. We achieve generator fingerprinting by
modulating convolutional filters with fingerprint embeddings. There exist a variety of
works about conditioning network parameters on the input, some using adaptive normalization [16,
22, 32, 34, 131], some using dynamic filters [17, 79, 86], and others using self/reference
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attention [4, 107, 109, 110, 260]. However, none of them pays attention to mitigate deep
fake misuse. We pioneer in this novel direction.
6.3 GAN fingerprinting networks
We present responsible disclosure of generative models as a novel solution to mitigate
deep fake misuse, which is agnostic to GAN techniques and sustainable along with their
evolution. In Section 6.3.1 we depict how our fingerprinting mechanism enables responsible
disclosure. We introduce in details our loss design in Section 6.3.2 and modulation design
in Section 6.3.2.
6.3.1 Problem statement
Generative models can be misused to spoof sensors, generate deep fakes, and enable
misinformation at scale [252, 253, 254]. Responsible researchers and companies like
OpenAI lean conservative to the side effects of their powerful generative models on
society. As a result, they have to provide only the APIs rather than the source code of
their models, and limit the access to them by approving users only after rigorous reviews.
This notably slows down the industrialization process for the deployment of generative
models.
One promising solution to mitigate responsible model owners’ concerns and enhance
their regulation is to enable responsible disclosure of their models and trace the users who
misuse their models. We achieve this by equipping owners with a model fingerprinting
auto-encoder, such that they can use the encoder to efficiently instantiate a large population
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of models with the same generation performance but with distinct fingerprints. As a
result, the model owner can release different model instances to different users, where
each user’s download corresponds to a unique fingerprint maintained by the owner’s
database. When misuse of a model happens, the model owner can use the decoder to
detect the fingerprint from the generated images, verify it to the database, and then trace
the responsibility of the user. Based on this form of responsible disclosure, responsible
model owners, like OpenAI, should feel safer and be stressed less by society when releasing
their powerful models, while at the same time having an automatic way to attribute
misuses.
Throughout the paper, we stand for the model owner’s perspective. The owner is
regarded as the management hub of our experiments. The generic model training, model
fingerprinting, model instance allocation to users, and deepfake detection/attribution are
all conducted on the owner’s side. None of the encoder, decoder, and training data are
accessible to the public.
6.3.2 Loss design
We list symbol notations at the beginning. We use latent code ∼ N (0, Idz) to
control generated contents. We set dz = 512. We represent fingerprint ∼ Ber(0.5)dc as a
sequence of bits. It follows Bernoulli distribution with probability 0.5. We non-trivially
choose the fingerprint length dc in Section 6.4.3. We denote encoder E mapping to its
embedding, generator G mapping (, E()) to the image domain, discriminator D mapping
an image ∼ pdata to the real/fake classification probability, and decoder F mapping an
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image to the decoded latent code and fingerprint (̂,̂ ). In the following formulations, we
denote G(, E()) as G(, ) for brevity.
We consider three goals in our training. First, we preserve the original functionality
of GANs to generate realistic images, as close to real distribution as possible. We use the







In addition, similar to [63], we reconstruct the latent code through the decoder F to
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where we use the first dz output elements of F that correspond to the decoded latent code.
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where we use the last dc output elements of F as the decoded fingerprint. σ(·) denotes the
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(b) Modulated convolutional layer.
Figure 6.2: The diagram of our fingerprinting pipeline and the zoom-in of the modulated
convolutional layer.
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is therefore a combination of binary classification for each bit.
It is worth noting that we use one decoder to decode both the latent code and
fingerprint, which benefits for cooperating between them so as to explicitly disentangle
their representations as discussed below.
The third goal is to disentangle the representation between latent code and fingerprint.
Desirably, latent code should have exclusive control over the generated content. This
sticks to the original generation functionality. Therefore, two images with different fingerprints





‖G(,1 )−G(,2 )‖22 (6.4)
The disentangled effect is demonstrated in Figure 6.3.
Our final training objective is as follows. We optimize it under the adversarial





λ1adv + λ2z + λ3c + λ4const (6.5)
where λ1 = 1.0, λ2 = 1.0, λ3 = 2.0, and λ4 = 2.0 are hyper-parameters to balance the
magnitude of each loss term. See Figure 6.2(a) for the diagram.
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6.3.3 Fingerprint modulation
At the architectural level, it is non-trivial how to embed E() into G. The gist
is to embed fingerprint into the generator parameters rather than generator input, so
that (1) our mechanism is agnostic to the architecture of a GAN model, and (2) after
training a generic model we can instantiate a large population of generators ad-hoc with
different fingerprints. The second point is a critical advantage to make our fingerprinting
efficient and scalable, as validated in Section 6.4.4. We then deploy only the fingerprinted
generator instances, not including the encoder.
We achieve this by modulating convolutional filters in the generator backbone with
our fingerprint embedding, similar in spirit of [17]. Given a convolutional kernel W ∈
R3×3×dl at layer l, we first project the fingerprint embeddingE() through an affine transformation
φl such that φl(E()) ∈ Rdl . The transformation is implemented as a fully-connect neural
layer with learnable parameters. We then scale each channel of W with the corresponding
value in φl. In specific,
W̃i,j,k = φl(E())k ·Wi,j,k, ∀i, j, k (6.6)
See Figure 6.2(b) for a diagram illustration. We compare to the other fingerprint embedding
architectures in Section 6.4.2 and validate the advantages of this one. We conduct modulation
for all the convolutional filters at layer l with the same fingerprint embedding. And
we investigate in Section 6.4.7 at which layer to modulate we can achieve the optimal
performance. A desirable trade-off is to modulate all convolutional layers.
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Note that, during training, latent code and fingerprint are jointly sampled. Yet for
deployment, the model owner first samples a fingerprint 0, then modulates the generator
G with 0, and then deploys only the modulated (fingerprinted) generator G(·,0 ) to a user.
For that user there allows only one input, i.e. the latent code, to the modulated generator.
The encoder E, decoder F , and discriminator D are all unavailable to the user. Once a
misuse happens, the model owner uses the decoder to decode the fingerprint and attribute
it to the user, so as to achieve responsible disclosure.
6.4 Experiments
We describe the experiment settings in Section 7.4.1. We validate several key
properties of a fingerprint mechanism from Section 6.4.2 to 6.4.5. We then apply our
mechanism to deep fake detection and attribution in Section 6.4.6. We conduct an ablation
study on filter modulation in Section 6.4.7.
6.4.1 Setup
Datasets. We conduct experiments on CelebA face dataset [206], LSUN Bedroom
and Cat datasets [207]. They are common datasets for image generation, and LSUN Cat
is the most challenging one reported in StyleGAN2 [17]. We train/evaluate on 30k/30k
CelebA, 30k/30k LSUN Bedroom at the size of 128×128×3, and 50k/50k LSUN Cat at
the size of 256×256×3.
GAN backbone. Our fingerprinting mechanism is agnostic to GAN configurations.
Without losing representativeness, we follow the line of milestone research [15, 16, 17]
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and build upon the most recent state-of-the-art StyleGAN2 [17] config E. This also aligns
to the settings in [3] and facilitates our direct comparisons in Section 6.4.2 and 6.4.6. One
modification happens to how we input the latent code. Instead of encoding it through filter
modulation, we find that directly feeding it through the input of the generator achieves
better results. See Section 6.4.2. Our model is trained from scratch with the original
training protocol in [17].
6.4.2 Effectiveness and fidelity
Evaluation. The effectiveness indicates that the input fingerprints consistently
appear in the generated images and can be accurately detected by the decoder. This
is measured by fingerprint detection bitwise accuracy over 30k random samples (with
random latent codes and random fingerprint codes). A larger value is more desirable.
We use 128 bits to represent a fingerprint. This is a non-trivial setting as analyzed in
Section 6.4.3.
The fidelity reflects how imperceptible the original generation performance is affected
by fingerprinting. It also helps avoid one’s suspect of the presence of fingerprints which
may attract adversarial fingerprint removal. Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) [118] is the
standard measure for generation quality. We report FID between 30k generated images
and 30k real testing images. A smaller value indicates the generated images are more
realistic in general.
Baselines. We compare to five baseline methods. The first baseline is the StyleGAN2 [17]
backbone with the original architecture: the latent code is encoded through filter modulation.
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CelebA LSUN Bedroom LSUN Cat
Method Bit acc ⇑ FID ⇓ Bit acc ⇑ FID ⇓ Bit acc ⇑ FID ⇓
StyleGAN2 - 9.37 - 19.24 - 31.01
[3] 0.989 14.13 0.983 21.31 0.990 32.60
Ours 0.991 11.50 0.993 20.50 0.996 33.94
Ours Variant I 0.999 12.98 0.999 20.68 0.500 34.23
Ours Variant II 0.987 13.86 0.927 21.70 0.869 34.33
Ours Variant III 0.990 22.59 0.896 64.91 0.901 51.74
Table 6.1: Fingerprint detection in bitwise accuracy and generation fidelity in FID. ⇑/⇓
indicates a higher/lower value is more desirable.
It provides the upper bound of fidelity while has no fingerprinting functionality.
The second baseline is [3] which is the other proactive but indirect fingerprinting
method for GANs. Regardless of its performance, our method is substantially more
efficient and scalable than theirs in practice, because they have to restart training with
a new data collection for each fingerprint. Preferably we can ad-hoc instantiate a large
population of fingerprinted generators with little overhead.
We also compare our mechanism to three architectural variants. The motivation
of these variants is to incorporate fingerprints in different manners. Variant I: modulating
convolutional filters with only latent code embedding, while instead feeding the fingerprint
code through the input of the generator. This is to test the necessity of fingerprint modulation.
Variant II: modulating filters twice, with latent code embedding and fingerprint code
embedding separately. Variant III: modulating filters with the embedding from the concatenation
of latent code and fingerprint code.
Results. From Table 6.1, we find that:
(1) On CelebA, all the methods achieve almost perfect fingerprint detection accuracy.
This is because CelebA is a landmark-aligned dataset with limited diversity, making
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Figure 6.3: Generated samples from five of our generator instances. For each row, we
use a unique fingerprint to instantiate a generator. For each column, we feed in the same
latent code to the generator instances. We validate the disentangled effect between latent
code and fingerprint, which equips each generator instance with identical functionality.
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fingerprinting synergize well with aligned pixel generation, regardless of model configuration.
(2) On LSUN Bedroom and Cat, only [3] and our optimal model obtain saturated
fingerprint detection accuracy. Ours Variant I, II, and III do not always achieve saturated
performance. Especially Ours Variant I fails on LSUN Cat. We reason that filter modulation
is a strong formulation for reconstruction. Modulating fingerprints is necessary for their
detection while modulating latent code along with fingerprint code distracts fingerprint
reconstruction and increases crosstalk among different fingerprints.
(3) Our method has comparable effectiveness and fidelity to [3], plus substantial
advantages in practice: We can encode fingerprints with little overhead while they have
to re-train for each fingerprint.
(4) Our method results in the optimal fidelity with slightly ≤2.93 FID degrading. It
is the cost to multi-task with fingerprint detection, but is negligible and worthy. Therefore,
our method is a desirable trade-off to achieves effectiveness and fidelity at the same time.
(5) We show in Figure 6.3 uncurated generated samples from a variety of our
generator instances. Image qualities are high. Fingerprints are imperceptible. And thanks
to the consistency loss const in Eq. 6.4, despite subtle color biases, different generator
instances can generate identical images with realistic structures and patterns given the
same latent code, while their fingerprints are still distinguishable by our decoder.
6.4.3 Capacity
The capacity indicates the number of unique fingerprints our mechanism can accommodate
without crosstalk between two fingerprints. This is determined by dc, the number of bits
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Figure 6.4: Fingerprint detection bitwise accuracy and its bottom line requirement w.r.t.
fingerprint bit length on CelebA. The gap is maximized at bit length 128, which therefore
becomes our choice.
for fingerprint representation, and by our detection accuracy (according to Section 6.4.2).
The choice of the number of bits is however non-trivial. A larger number can
accommodate more unique fingerprints, but can also deteriorate fingerprint detection
accuracy. This is because the limited number of fingerprint samples during training is
not sufficient to cover the whole space, which may not generalize to testing. A testing
fingerprint is very likely not seen or cannot be well represented by training samples.
To figure out the optimal fingerprint bit length, we conduct the following experiments.
On one hand, given one length, we evaluate our detection accuracy. On the other hand,
we estimate the bottom-line requirement for detection accuracy. This is calculated as the
maximal bit overlap percentage among a large bag (1 million) of fingerprint samples. An
ideal fingerprint detector should reach an accuracy that is not coarser than this overlap
percentage.
In Figure 6.4, we vary the fingerprint bit length in the options of {32, 64, 128, 256, 512},
and plot the bitwise detection accuracy in red and the bottom line requirement in blue. We
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find:
(1) The bottom line requirement to detection accuracy is monotonically decreasing
w.r.t. the bit length of fingerprint because, given a finite bag of fingerprint samples, the
larger the bit length, the less likely two fingerprints overlap heavily.
(2) The testing accuracy is also monotonically decreasing w.r.t. the bit length of
fingerprints. This is due to the generalization issue of fingerprint sampling, as aforementioned.
(3) The testing accuracy is empirically decreasing more slowly at the beginning and
then faster than its bottom line requirement w.r.t. bit length. We, therefore, pick the bit
length 128 as the optimal choice for which the gap between the two plots is maximized.
We stick to this for all our experiments.
(4) Considering together our detection bitwise accuracy ≥0.991 and our fingerprint
bit length 128, we derive in principle our mechanism can hold 2128×0.991 ≈ 1036 distinct
fingerprints and therefore can result in such a large capacity of identifiable generators.
6.4.4 Scalability
Scalability is one of the advantageous properties of our mechanism: During training,
we can efficiently instantiate a large capacity of generators with arbitrary fingerprints on
the fly, so that fingerprint detection generalizes well during testing. To validate this, we
compare to baselines where we intentionally downgrade our method with access to only
a fixed set of fingerprints. Without losing representativeness, these baselines stand for the
category of non-scalable fingerprinting methods that have to re-train a generator instance
for each fingerprint, e.g. [3]. We cannot directly compare to [3] because it is impractical
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Sampling on the fly 0.991 0.991
Table 6.2: Fingerprint detection in bitwise accuracy on CelebA during training and
testing. ⇑ indicates a higher value is more desirable. Detection starts to generalize with
10k fingerprint training samples.
(time-consuming) to instantiate a large number of their generators for analysis.
From Table 6.2 we show that fingerprint detection fails to generalize unless we can
instantiate generators with 10k or more fingerprint samples. This indicates the necessity
to equip GANs with an efficient and scalable fingerprinting mechanism, preferably the
one on the fly. The results show that we can stick to the principle to reach a capacity of
1036.
6.4.5 Robustness and immunizability
Robustness against image perturbations is another advantageous property of our
mechanism. When it does not hold for some perturbations, the immunizability property
compensates for it.
The motivation to validate the robustness and immunizability of fingerprint detection
lies in the fact that deep fakes in the open end may undergo post-processing environments
and result in quality deterioration. Following the protocol in [2], we evaluate the robustness
against five types of image perturbation: cropping and resizing, blurring with Gaussian
kernel, JPEG compression, additive Gaussian noise, and random combination of them.
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We consider two versions of our model: the original version and the immunized version.
An immunized model indicates that during training we augment generated images with
the corresponding perturbation in random strengths before feeding them to the fingerprint
decoder.
It is worth noting that we, standing for the model owners, are regarded as the
management hub of the experiments. Except for the fingerprinted generator instances,
none of the encoder, decoder, and training data are accessible to the public. Therefore,
the robustness against perturbation has to be experimented with the black-box assumption,
as protocoled in [2]. In other words, white-box perturbations such as adversarial image
modifications [261] and fingerprint overwriting, which requires access to the encoder,
decoder, and/or training data, are not applicable in our scenario.
We plot in Figure 6.5 the fingerprint detection accuracy of our original and immunized
models w.r.t. the strength of each perturbation. We find:
(1) For all the perturbations, fingerprint detection accuracy drops monotonically
as we increase the strength of perturbation. For some perturbations in red plots, i.e.,
blurring and JPEG compression, accuracy drops slowly in a reasonably large range.
We consider accepting accuracy ≥75%. As a result, the robust working range under
blurring is: Gaussian blur kernel size ∼ [0, 7]; under JPEG compression is: JPEG quality
∼ [80, 100]. Usually, the images turn not functional with perturbations heavier than this
range. We, therefore, validate the robustness of our original model against blurring and
JPEG compression.
(2) For the other perturbations, although our original model is not robust enough,
immunization (perturbed augmentation) compensates significantly in blue dots. We consider
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(a) FID = 16.14 (b) FID = 15.82 (c) FID = 12.01
(d) FID = 34.78 (e) FID = 18.40
Figure 6.5: Red plots show, on CelebA, the fingerprint detection of our original model
in bitwise accuracy w.r.t. the strength of perturbations. Blue plots show those of our
immunized models. We consider accepting accuracy ≥75%. Therefore, our model is
robust against blurring and JPEG compression, and is immunizable against cropping,
Gaussian noise, and the combined perturbation. FID under each plot indicates the fidelity
of each immunized model. FID of our original model is 11.50.
accepting accuracy ≥75%. As a result, the immunized working range under cropping is:
cropping size ∼ [60, 128]; under Gaussian noise is: noise standard deviation ∼ [0.0, 0.4];
under combined perturbation is: the combination of the robust or immunized working
ranges aforementioned. Usually the images turn not functional with perturbations heavier
than this range. We, therefore, validate the immunizability of our model against cropping,
Gaussian noise, and the combined perturbation.
(3) We also report the FID of each immunized model in the sub-captions. Augmentation
with perturbations indeed has a side effect on the adversarial training and consequently
on the fidelity. However, except for Gaussian noise immunization, the degrading from the
others is to a reasonably small extent. We reason the challenge roots in the instability of
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adversarial training: the minimax formulation and alternating gradient ascent-descent.
6.4.6 Deep fake detection and attribution
We have justified the effectiveness, robustness, and immunizability of our method
for fingerprint detection. It in turn benefits our initial motivation: deep fake detection and
attribution. The former task is a binary classification problem to distinguish between real
and fake. The latter task is to further finely label the source of a generated image. We
merge the two tasks into one with 1+N classes: 1 real-world source and N GAN sources,
where N can be extremely large, as large as our capacity 1036 in Section 6.4.3.
Unlike previous methods that have to rely on inherent differences between real
and fake [1, 2, 218, 220], our method proactively encodes identifiable fingerprints into
generator instances and consequently into the generated images. Then the tasks are
converted to verifying if one decoded fingerprint is in our database or not. This is
achieved by comparing the decoded fingerprint to each fingerprint in the database given
a threshold of bit overlap. According to our ≥0.991 fingerprint detection accuracy, it
should be reliable to set the threshold at 128 × 0.95 ≈ 121. If the bit overlap is larger
than this threshold, the fingerprint is verified in the database. Then the attribution is trivial
because we can directly look up the generator instance according to the fingerprint. If the
fingerprint is not in the database, it should be a random fingerprint decoded from a real
image. We use our immunized model against the combined perturbations in Section 6.4.5.
We assume the testing images are within its wide working ranges.
Baselines. We compare to two state-of-the-art deep fake classifiers [1, 2] as learning-
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Closed world #GANs Open world #GANs
Method 1 10 100 1 10 100
[2] 0.997 0.998 0.955 0.893 0.102 N/A
[1] 0.890 N/A N/A 0.883 N/A N/A
[3] 1.000 1.000 N/A 1.000 1.000 N/A
Ours 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 6.3: Deep fake detection and attribution accuracy on CelebA. A higher value is
more desirable. It is impractical to train too many binary classifiers for [2] when the
number of GANs is large (e.g. 100) in the open world. It is neither impractical to train
too many fingerprinted generators (e.g. 100) for [3]. [1] is not applicable for deep fake
attribution (i.e. N > 1).
based baselines passively relying on inherent visual clues. Because a learning-based
method can only enumerate a small fixed set of training labels, we consider two scenarios
for it: closed world and open world. The difference is whether the testing GAN sources
are seen during training or not. This does not matter to our method because ours can work
with anyN ≤ 1036. For the closed world, we train/evaluate a baseline classifier on 10k/1k
images from each of theN+1 sources. For the open world, we trainN+1 1-vs-the-other
binary classifiers, and predict as ”the other” label if and only if all the classifiers predict
negative results. We test on 1k images from each of the real source or N unseen GAN
sources.
We in addition refer to [3] in comparisons as the other proactive but indirect model
fingerprinting baseline.
Results. From Table 6.3 we find:
(1) Deep fake detection and attribution based on our fingerprints perform equally
perfectly (∼ 100% accuracy) to most of the baselines in the closed world when the number
of GAN sources is not too large. However, when N = 100, [3] is not applicable due to
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its limited efficiency and scalability. Neither is [1] due to its binary classification nature.
(2) Open world is also a trivial scenario to our method but challenges the baseline
classifiers [1, 2]. When the number of unseen GAN sources increases to 10, [2] even
degenerates close to random guess. This is a common generalization issue of the learning-
based method. [3] is still impractical when N is large.
(3) Since deep fake detection and attribution is a trivial task to our method, it makes
our advantages independent of the evolution of GAN techniques. It guarantees to verify
decoded fingerprints to the model owner’s fingerprint database and trace the responsibility
of model misuse. This suggests a novel direction for model owner’s responsible disclosure.
6.4.7 Ablation study on modulation
For completeness, as an ablation study, we investigate the effectiveness of fingerprint
detection and fidelity of generation when modulating fingerprint embeddings to different
generator layers (resolutions).
From Table 6.4 we find:
(1) For effectiveness, the optimal single layer to modulate fingerprints appears in
one of the middle layers, specific to datasets: 16×16 for CelebA and 8×8 for LSUN
Bedroom. But our all-layer modulation can achieve comparable or better performance.
This should be consistent with different datasets because fingerprint detection turns more
effective when we encode fingerprints to more parts of the generator.
(2) For fidelity, the side effect of fingerprinting is less significant if modulation
happens in the shallower layer. This is because fingerprinting and generation are distinct
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CelebA LSUN Bedroom
Layer Bit acc ⇑ FID ⇓ Bit acc ⇑ FID ⇓
4×4 0.953 12.06 0.693 21.44
8×8 0.981 12.06 0.950 21.15
16×16 0.993 11.90 0.935 20.98
32×32 0.991 11.07 0.894 20.24
64×64 0.972 10.77 0.816 19.85
128×128 0.946 10.67 0.805 19.67
Ours (all layers) 0.991 11.50 0.993 20.50
Table 6.4: Fingerprint detection in bitwise accuracy and generation fidelity in FID w.r.t.
the layer to modulate fingerprints. ⇑/⇓ indicates a higher/lower value is more desirable.
tasks, and a shallower modulation leads to less crosstalk. However, considering the FID
variance is not significant in general, we regard all-layer modulation as a desirable trade-
off between effectiveness and fidelity.
6.5 Conclusion
One sustainable solution to mitigate the misuse of deep fakes is to enable a responsible
disclosure of generative models. We achieve this by a novel fingerprinting mechanism. It
allows an efficient and scalable ad-hoc generation of a large population of models with
distinct fingerprints. Experiments show that our method fulfills several key properties:
effectiveness, fidelity, large capacity, scalability, robustness, and immunizability. We
validate its saturated performance and advantages over previous learning-based discriminative
methods in the deep fake detection and attribution tasks, which makes it independent of
the evolution of GAN techniques and agnostic to the other detection baselines.
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Chapter 7: Inclusive GAN: Improving Data and Minority Coverage in
Generative Models
7.1 Introduction
Photorealistic image generation has increasingly become reality, thanks to the emergence
of large-scale datasets [18, 19, 20] and deep generative models [64, 145, 248, 249].
However, these advances have come at a cost: there could be potential biases in the
learned model against underrepresented data subgroups [57, 58, 59, 60, 61]. The biases
are rooted in the inevitable imbalance in the dataset [62], which are preserved or even
exacerbated by the generative models [58]. In particular, reconstructive (non-adversarial)
generative models like variational autoencoders (VAEs) [248, 262] can preserve data
biases against minorities due to their objective of reproducing the frequencies images
occur in the dataset, while adversarial generative models (GANs) [13, 132, 145, 158,
263, 264, 265, 266, 267] can implicitly disregard infrequent images due to the well-
established problem of mode collapse [63, 64], thereby further introducing model biases
on top of data biases. This issue is particularly acute from the perspective of minority
inclusion, because training data associated with minority subgroups by definition do not
form dominant modes. Consequently, data from minority groups are rare to begin with,
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Figure 7.1: The diagram of our method. It harmonizes adversarial (GAN) and
reconstructive (IMLE) training in one framework without introducing an auxiliary
encoder. GAN guides arbitrary sampling towards generating realistic appearances
approximate to some real data while IMLE ensures data coverage where there are always
generated samples approximate to each real data. See Section 7.3.3 for more details
where Gθ and Dψ represent the trainable generator and discriminator in a GAN, and F
represents a distant metric, in some cases, a pre-trained neural network.
and would not be capable of being produced by the generative model at all due to mode
collapse.
In this work, we aim to improve the comprehensive performance of the state-of-
the-art generative models, with a specific focus on their coverage of minority subgroups.
We start with an empirical study on the correlation between data biases and model biases,
and then formalize the objective of alleviating model bias in terms of improving data
coverage, in particular over the minority subgroups. We propose a new method known as
IMLE-GAN that achieves competitive image quality while ensuring improved coverage
of minority groups.
130
Our method harmonizes adversarial and reconstructive generative models, in the
process combining the benefits of both. Adversarial models have evolved to generate
photorealistic results, whereas reconstructive models offer guarantees on data coverage.
We build upon one of the state-of-the-art implementations of adversarial models, i.e.,
StyleGAN2 [267], and incorporate it with the Implicit Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(IMLE) framework [64], which is at its core reconstructive. See Figure 7.1 for a diagram.
Different from the existing hybrid generative models [63, 249, 268, 269] that require
training an auxiliary encoder network alongside a vanilla GAN, our method operates
purely with the standard components of a GAN. This brings two main benefits: (1) it
sidesteps the complication from combining the minimax objective used by adversarial
models and the pure minimization objective used by reconstructive models, and (2) it
avoids carrying over the practical issues of training auxiliary encoder, like posterior collapse [270,
271], which can cause the regression-to-the-mean problem, leading to blurry images.
We validate our method with thorough experiments and demonstrate more comprehensive
data coverage that goes beyond that of existing state-of-the-art methods. In addition, our
method can be flexibly adapted to ensure the inclusion of specified minority subgroups,
which cannot be easily achieved in the context of existing methods.
Contributions. We summarize our main contributions as follows: (1) we study the
problem of underrepresented minority inclusion and formalize it as a data coverage problem
in generative modeling; (2) we present a novel paradigm of harmonizing adversarial and
reconstructive modeling for improving data coverage; (3) our experiments set up a new
suite of state-of-the-art performance in terms of covering both seen and unseen data; and




Bias mitigation efforts for machine learning. Bias in machine learning results from
data imbalance, which can be detected and alleviated by three categories of approaches:
The pre-process approaches that purify data from bias before training [272, 273, 274,
275], the in-process approaches that enforce fairness during training with constraints
or regularization in the objectives [62, 276, 277, 278], and the post-process approaches
that adjust the output from a learned model [279, 280]. A comprehensive survey [281]
articulates this taxonomy. These approaches target biases in classification and cannot be
adapted to generative modeling.
Bias mitigation efforts for generative models. There have been relatively few papers [57,
58, 59, 60, 61] that focus on biases in generative models. [57, 59, 60], motivated from
benefiting a downstream classifier, mainly aim for fair generation conditioned on attribute
inputs, in terms of yielding allocative decisions and/or removing the correlation between
generation and attribute conditions. [58] focuses on understanding the inductive bias so
as to investigate the generalization of generative models. [61] proposes an importance
weighting strategy to compensate for the biases of learned generative models. Different
from their goals and solutions that equalize performance across different data subgroups
possibly at the cost of overall performance, we instead aim to improve the overall data
coverage, with a specific purpose of ensuring more significant gains over the underrepresented
minorities.
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Data coverage in GANs. GANs are finicky to train because of the minimax formulation
and the alternating gradient ascent-descent. In addition, GANs are known to exhibit
mode collapse, where the generator only learns to generate a subset of the modes of the
underlying data distribution. To alleviate mode collapse in GANs, some methods propose
to improve the minimax loss function [65, 66, 282, 283], some methods apply constraints
or regularization terms along with the minimax objectives [284, 285, 286, 287, 288], and
some other methods aim to modify the discriminator designs [13, 289, 290, 291]. These
directions are orthogonal to our research while, in principle, demonstrate less effective
data coverage than the hybrid models below.
Data coverage in hybrid generative models. Reconstructive (non-adversarial) generative
models like variational autoencoders (VAEs) [248, 262], on the other hand, are more
successful at data coverage because they explicitly try to maximize a lower bound on the
likelihood of the real data. This motivates a variety of designs for hybrid models that
combine reconstruction and adversarial training. α-GAN [268] is trained to reconstruct
pixels while VAEGAN [249] is trained to reconstruct discriminator features. ALI [264],
BiGAN [265], and SVAE [292] propose to instead jointly match the bidirectional mappings
between data and latent distributions. VEEGAN [63] is designed with reconstruction in
the latent space, in the purpose of avoiding the metric dilemma in the data space. Hybrid
models benefit for mode coverage, but deteriorate generation fidelity in practice, because
of their dependency on auxiliary encoder networks. In contrast, our method follows
the idea of hybrid models, but avoids an encoder network and instead apply all training
back-propagation through the generator. A recent non-adversarial generative framework,
Implicit Maximum Likelihood Estimation (IMLE) [64], satisfies our design. We discuss
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more about the advantages of IMLE in Section 7.3.2.
7.3 Inclusive GAN for Data and Minority Coverage
Our method is a novel paradigm of harmonizing the strengths of adversarial (Section 7.3.1)
and reconstructive generative models (Section 7.3.2) that avoids mode collapse. The
harmonization efforts (Section 7.3.3) are necessary and non-trivial due to the incompatibility
between the two. In Section 7.3.4 we show the straightforward adaptation of our method
to improve minority inclusion.
7.3.1 Adversarial Generation: GANs
Photorealistic image generation can be viewed as the problem of sampling from the
unknown probability distribution of real-world images. Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) [145] introduce an elegant solution for distribution estimation, which is formulated
as a discriminative classification problem, and enables supervised learning methods to be
used for this task.
A GAN consists of two deep neural networks: a generator Gθ : Rd 7→ RD and a
discriminatorDψ : RD 7→ [0, 1]. The generator maps a latent noise vector z ∼ N (0, Id) to
an image, and the discriminator predicts the probability that the image it sees is real. The
real ground truth images are denoted as x ∼ p̂(x), sampled from an unknown distribution
p̂(x). The discriminator is trained to maximize classification accuracy while the generator
is trained to produce images that can fool the discriminator. More precisely, the objective
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Ladv(θ, ψ) = Ex∼p̂(x) [logDψ(x)] + Ez∼N (0,Id) [log(1−Dψ(Gθ(z)))] (7.1)
Unfortunately, GANs are unstable to train and suffer from mode collapse: While
each generated sample gets to pick a mode it is drawn to, each mode does not get to pick
a generated sample. After training, the generator will not be able to generate samples
around the “unpopular” modes.
Minority modes are precisely the “unpopular” modes that are more likely to be
collapsed. As shown in Section 7.4.3 and Figure 7.2, minority subgroups with diverse
appearances indeed bring more challenges to generative modeling and are allocated worse
coverage compared to the others. Therefore, we propose to leverage reconstructive models
to improve the coverage of minority subgroups.
7.3.2 Reconstructive Generation: IMLE
Our novel paradigm is based on a recent reconstructive framework, Implicit Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (IMLE) [64], that favors complete mode coverage. IMLE avoids
mode collapse by reversing the direction in which generated samples are matched to real
modes. In GANs, each generated sample is effectively matched to a real mode. In IMLE,
each real mode is matched to a generated sample. This ensures that all real modes,
including each underrepresented minority mode, are matched, and no real mode is left
out.
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where z∗ =i∈{1,...,m}‖Gθ(zi)− x‖22 (7.4)
The joint optimization is achieved by alternating between the two decoupled phases
until convergence. The first phase corresponds to the inner optimization, where we search
for each x the optimal z∗(x) from the latent vector candidates, given a fixed Gθ. This is
implemented by the Prioritized DCI [293], a fast nearest neighbor search algorithm. The
second phase corresponds to the outer optimization, where we train the generator in the
regular back-propagation manner, given pairs of (x, z∗(x)).
One significant advantage of IMLE over the other reconstructive models is the
elimination of the need for an auxiliary encoder. The encoder encourages mode coverage
but at the cost of either deviating the latent sampling distribution from the original prior (in
VAEGAN [249]) or absorbing the training gradients before substantially back-propagating
to the generator (in VEEGAN [63]). Unlike them, IMLE directly samples latent vector
from a natural prior during training and encourages explicit reconstruction fully upon the
generator.
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7.3.3 Harmonizing Adversarial and Reconstructive Generation: IMLE-
GAN
Below we propose a way to harmonize adversarial training with the IMLE framework,
so as to ensure both generation quality (precision) and coverage (recall) simultaneously.
The vanilla hybrid model between IMLE and GAN is to directly add the adversarial
loss in Eq. 7.1 to the non-adversarial loss in Eq. 7.2. This has two problems because of
(1) differences in the domains over which latent vectors are sampled and (2) differences
in the metric spaces on which GAN and IMLE operate. For (1), in the case of GAN, a
different latent vector is randomly sampled every iteration, whereas in the case of IMLE,
many latent vectors are sampled at once (over which matching is performed) and are kept
fixed for many iterations. The former gives up control over which data point each latent
vector is asked to generate by the discriminator, but can avoid overfitting to any one latent
vector. The latter explicitly controls which latent vectors are matched to data points,
but can overfit to the set of matched latent vectors until they are resampled. For (2), in
the case of GAN, the discriminator takes the inner product between the features and the
weight vector of the last layer to produce a realism score, and so it effectively operates
on features of images; on the other hand, in the case of IMLE, matching is performed on
raw pixels.
To bridge the gap in losses, we propose two adaptations that better harmonize the
GAN and IMLE objectives. First, to make the domain over which latent vectors are
sampled denser, we augment the matched latent vectors with random linear interpolations.
Second, to make the spaces on which the two losses are computed more comparable, we
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measure the reconstruction loss in a deep feature space instead of pixel space, such that
it contains a comparable amount and level of semantic information to that used by the










Here Ladv(θ, ψ) is as defined in Eq. 7.1,
Lrec(θ) =Ex∼p̂(x)
[
‖F (Gθ(z∗(x)))− F (x)‖22
]
(7.6)
where z∗(x) =i∈{1,...,m}‖F (Gθ(zi))− F (x)‖22, (7.7)
and Litp(θ) =Ex,x̃∼p̂(x),α∼U [0,1]
[
α‖F (Gθ(z∗(α,x, x̃)))− F (x)‖22+ (7.8)
(1− α)‖F (Gθ(z∗(α,x, x̃)))− F (x̃)‖22
]
(7.9)
where z∗(α,x, x̃) =αz∗(x) + (1− α)z∗(x̃) (7.10)
Here Eq. 7.6 generalizes Eq. 7.3 by computing distance in feature space, where F (·) is a
fixed function to compute features of images. Eq. 7.8 and 7.9 defines the interpolation
loss, which linearly interpolates between two matched latent vectors z∗(x), z∗(x̃) (as
shown in Eq. 7.10) and tries to make the image generated from the interpolated latent
vector z∗(α,x, x̃) similar to the two ground truth images x, x̃ that correspond to the latent
vectors at the endpoints. The weight on the distance to each ground truth image depends
on how close the interpolated latent vector is to the endpoint, which is denoted by α. λ and
β are used to balance each loss term. We experiment with four possible feature spaces:
raw pixels, discriminator features [249], Inception features [7], and LPIPS features (i.e.:
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features such that the `2 distance between them is equivalent to the LPIPS perceptual
metric [294]), and find LPIPS features perform the best.
Algorithm 1: IMLE-GAN with Minority Inclusion
Data: Real training data p̂(x) and a specified minority subgroup q̂(y)
Result: A generator Gθ with specified minority inclusion performance
for epoch = {1, . . . , E} do
if epoch % S == 0 then
Sample z1, . . . , zm ∼ N (0, Id) i.i.d.;
for yj ∼ q̂(y) do
z∗(yj)← arg mini∈{1,...,m} ||F (Gθ(zi))− F (yj)||22;
for xk ∼ p̂(x) and yi,yj ∼ q̂(y) do
Sample z ∼ N (0, Id);
Ladv ← logDψ(xk) + log(1−Dψ(Gθ(z)));
Sample δi, δj ∼ N (0, σId) i.i.d.;
z∗i ← z∗(yi) + δi;
z∗j ← z∗(yj) + δj;
Lrec ← 1
2
(||F (Gθ(z∗i ))− F (yi)||22 + ||F (Gθ(z∗j))− F (yj)||22);
Sample α ∼ U [0, 1];
z∗ij = αz
∗
i + (1− α)z∗j ;
Litp ← α||F (Gθ(z∗ij))− F (yi)||22 + (1− α)||F ((Gθ(z∗ij))− F (yj)||22;
L← Ladv + λLrec + βLitp;
ψ = ψ + η∇ψL;
θ = θ − η∇θL;
7.3.4 Minority Coverage in IMLE-GAN
IMLE-GAN framework is designed to improve the overall mode coverage. One
benefit compared to other hybrid models is that it is straightforward to adapt it for minority
inclusion. We simply need to replace the empirical distribution over the entire dataset p̂(x)
with a distribution q̂(x) whose support only covers a specified minority subgroup (i.e.:
supp(q̂) ⊂ supp(p̂)) in Eq. 7.6 and 7.8 (for reconstructive training) and leave Eq. 7.1
unchanged (for adversarial training). This ensures an explicit coverage over the minority
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while still carrying out the approximation to the entire real data. This comes with another
advantage: because q̂(x) in practice has support over a much smaller set than p̂(x), there is
less data imbalance and variance within the support of q̂(x) than in p̂(x), thereby requiring
less model capacity to model. As a result, covering q̂(x) should be easier than covering
p̂(x), and so the perceptual quality of samples tend to improve.
We summarize our IMLE-GAN algorithm with minority inclusion in Algorithm 1,
where E is the number of training epochs, S indicates how often (in epochs) to update
latent matching, m is the pool size of the latent vector candidates, δi, δj are the additive
Gaussian perturbations, and η is the learning rate.
7.4 Experiments
We articulate the experimental setup in Section 7.4.1. In Section 7.4.2 we start with
preliminary validation on Stacked MNIST dataset [282], an easy and interpretable task. In
Section 7.4.3 we conduct empirical study to analyze the correlation between data bias and
model bias. In Section 7.4.4 we perform comprehensive evaluation and comparisons on
CelebA dataset [19], and finally specify minority inclusion applications in Section 7.4.5.
7.4.1 Setup
Datasets. For preliminary study, we employ Stacked MNIST dataset [282] for explicit
data coverage evaluation. 240,000 RGB images in the size of 32×32 are synthesized by
stacking three random digit images from MNIST [295] along the color channel, resulting
in 1,000 explicit modes in a uniform distribution.
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We conduct our main experiments on CelebA human face dataset [19], where the
40 binary facial attributes are used to specify minority subgroups. We sample the first
30,000 images in the size of 128×128 for GAN training, and sample the last 3,000 or
30,000 images for validation.
GAN backbone. We build our IMLE-GAN framework on the state-of-the-art StyleGAN2 [267]
architecture for unconditional image generation. We reuse all their default settings.
Baseline methods. Besides the backbone StyleGAN2 [267], we also compare our method
to eight techniques that show improvement in data coverage and/or generation diversity:
SNGAN [13], Dist-GAN [286], DSGAN [287], PacGAN [288], ALI [264], VAEGAN [249],
α-GAN [268], and VEEGAN [63]. For VAEGAN which originally involves image reconstruction
in the discriminator feature space, we also experiment with three other distance metrics
as discussed in Section 7.3.3. For fair comparisons, we replace the original architectures
used in all methods with StyleGAN2.
Evaluation. For Stacked MNIST, following [63, 282], we report the number of generated
modes that is detected by a pre-trained mode classifier, as well as the KL divergence
between the generated mode distribution and the uniform distribution. The statistics are
calculated from 240,000 randomly generated samples.
For CelebA, Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) [118] is used to reflect both data
quality (precision) and coverage (recall) in an entangled manner. We also explicitly
measure the Precision and Recall [296] of a generative model w.r.t. the real dataset in
the Inception space. Moreover, to emphasize on instance-level data coverage, we further
include Inference via Optimization Measure (IvOM) [282] into our metric suite, which
measures the mean reconstruction error from a generative model given each query image.
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# modes (max 1000) (⇑) KL to uniform (⇓)
StyleGAN2 [267] 940 0.424
SNGAN [13] 571 1.382
DSGAN [287] 955 0.343
PacGAN [288] 908 0.638
ALI [264] 956 0.680
VAEGAN [249] 929 0.534
VEEGAN [63] 987 0.310
Ours LPIPS interp 997 0.200
Table 7.1: Comparisons on Stacked MNIST dataset. The statistics are calculated from
240,000 randomly generated samples. We indicate for each metric whether a higher (⇑)
or lower (⇓) value is more desirable. We highlight the best performance in bold.
We also report the standard deviation of IvOM across 40 CelebA attributes, in order to
evaluate the balance of generative coverage. For the generalization purpose, we evaluate
over both the training set and a validation set (unseen during training).
7.4.2 Preliminary Study on Stacked MNIST
In a real-world data distribution, the notion of modes is difficult to quantize. We
instead start with Stacked MNIST [282] where 1,000 discrete modes are unambiguously
synthesized. This allows us to zoom in the challenge of mode collapse and facilitate a
precise pre-validation.
We report the evaluation in Table 7.1. Our method narrows down the gap between
experimental performance and the theoretical limit: It covers the most number of modes
and achieves the closest mode distribution to the uniform distribution ground truth. This
study validates the improved effectiveness of harmonizing IMLE with GAN, compared
to the other GAN models or hybrid models, in terms of explicit mode/data coverage. This
sheds the light and pre-qualifies to apply our method on more complicated real-world
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datasets.
7.4.3 Empirical Study on Data and Model Biases
As discussed in Section 7.2, data biases lead to biases in generative models. Even
worse, a model without attention to minorities can exacerbate such biases against allocating
adequate representation capacities to them. In this empirical study, we first show the
existence of biases across CelebA attributes in terms of sample counts and sample variance,
and then correlate them to the biased performance of the backbone StyleGAN2 [267].
As shown in the left barplot of Figure 7.2, given the attribute histogram over 30,000
samples, 29 out of 40 binary attributes are more than 50% biased from the balance point
(15,000 out of 30,000 samples with a positive attribute annotation, shown as the red
dashed line). On the other hand, in the right barplot of Figure 7.2, we calculate the
standard deviation of Inception features [7] of samples within each attribute, and notice a
wide range spanning from 0.038 to 0.062.
Too few samples or too large appearance variance in one attribute discourages
generative coverage for that attribute, and thus results in biases. To quantify the per-
attribute coverage, we measure the mean IvOM [282] over positive training samples. A
larger value indicates a worse coverage. In the middle barplot of Figure 7.2, we visualize
the correlation between IvOM and the joint distribution of sample counts and sample
variance. There is a clear gradient trend of IvOM when the samples of an attribute
turn rarer and/or more diverse. To validate such a strong correlation, we first normalize
the sample counts and sample variance across attributes by their means and standard
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Figure 7.2: Visualizations for data and model biases. Left: Sorted CelebA attribute
histogram with a balance point marked by the red dashed line. Right: Sorted Inception
feature variance per attribute. Middle: Per-attribute mean IvOM over 30,000 CelebA
training samples for StyleGAN2 (red) and for our method (blue), where each bar
corresponds to one attribute.
deviations. Then we simply add them up as a joint variable vector, and calculate its
Spearman’s ranking correlation to the per-attribute IvOM. For StyleGAN2 (the red bar),
the correlation coefficient of 0.75 indicates a strong correlation between data biases and
model biases. This evidences the urgency to mitigate biases against the rare and diverse
samples, in another word, to enhance the coverage over minority subgroups.
7.4.4 Comparisons on CelebA
In Section 7.3.3 we propose two strategies to harmonize adversarial and reconstructive
training: the deep distance metric and the interpolation-based augmentation. We obtain:
(1) LPIPS similarity shows near-top performance all around measures; and (2) interpolation-
based augmentation consistently benefits all the measures in general for all the distance
metrics. We therefore employ both into our full method.
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FID30k Precision30k Recall30k IvOM3k IvOM3k std
⇓ ⇑ ⇑ ⇓ ⇓
Method Train Val Train Val Train Val Train Val Train Val
StyleGAN2 [267] 9.37 9.49 0.855 0.844 0.730 0.741 0.303 0.302 0.0268 0.0264
SNGAN [13] 13.32 13.24 0.792 0.787 0.631 0.616 0.325 0.322 0.0274 0.0261
Dist-GAN [286] 30.97 30.44 0.511 0.595 0.360 0.385 0.282 0.280 0.0220 0.0209
DSGAN [287] 14.29 14.00 0.868 0.862 0.679 0.724 0.301 0.300 0.0227 0.0220
PacGAN [288] 15.05 15.12 0.870 0.869 0.726 0.758 0.311 0.308 0.0256 0.0238
ALI [264] 10.09 10.06 0.842 0.867 0.688 0.710 0.298 0.297 0.0240 0.0245
VAEGAN [249] LPIPS 24.10 23.47 0.878 0.851 0.572 0.560 0.318 0.315 0.0284 0.0272
α-GAN [268] 12.65 12.53 0.803 0.810 0.757 0.763 0.267 0.267 0.0208 0.0192
VEEGAN [63] 16.34 16.13 0.752 0.768 0.660 0.695 0.260 0.269 0.0190 0.0181
Ours LPIPS interp 11.56 11.28 0.927 0.941 0.849 0.848 0.255 0.262 0.0193 0.0195
Ours Eyeglasses 13.54 14.43 0.914 0.910 0.890 0.895 0.255 0.265 0.0249 0.0193
Ours Bald 13.34 13.46 0.903 0.895 0.886 0.892 0.268 0.272 0.0381 0.0227
Ours EN&HM 15.18 15.00 0.885 0.891 0.830 0.842 0.268 0.270 0.0318 0.0277
Ours BUE&HC&A 14.27 13.85 0.878 0.874 0.871 0.884 0.262 0.266 0.0300 0.0254
Table 7.2: Comparisons on CelebA dataset. We indicate for each metric whether a higher
(⇑) or lower (⇓) value is more desirable. The first part corresponds to the comparisons
among different methods. For VAEGAN we report the results based on LPIPS distance
metric. We highlight the best performance in bold and the second best performance with
underline. We visualize the radar plots in Figure 7.3 for the comprehensive evaluation
of each method over the validation set. The second part corresponds to our minority
inclusion model variants in Section 7.4.5.
Figure 7.3: Radar plots for the first part of Table 7.2. “P” represents Precision, “R”
represents Recall, and “Std” represents IvOM standard deviation. Values have been
normalized to the unit range, and axes are inverted so that the higher value is always
better.
145
Figure 7.4: Reconstructed samples on the left (used for IvOM evaluation) and random
generation samples on the right (used for FID, precision, and recall evaluation). The query
images for reconstruction in the bottom left row are real and unseen during training.
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To evaluate our data coverage performance in practice, we conduct comprehensive
comparisons on CelebA [19] against baseline methods. The first part of Table 7.2 shows
our comparisons. Figure 7.3 assists interpret the table. We find:
(1) FID is not a gold standard to reflect the entire capability of a generative model,
as it ranks differently from the other metrics.
(2) Compared to the original backbone StyleGAN2 which achieves the second-best
FID, our full method (“Ours LPIPS interp”) trades slight FID deterioration for significant
boosts in all the other metrics. This is meaningful because precision (FID) can be traded
off at the expense of recall (Recall, IvOM) via the truncation trick used in [158, 267],
while the opposite direction is infeasible.
(3) Our full method outperforms all the existing state-of-the-art techniques in terms
of Precision, Recall, and IvOM, where the latter two are the key evidence for effective
data coverage. The last radar plot in Figure 7.3 shows our method achieves near-top
measures all around with the most balanced performance.
(4) Our method also achieves the top-3 performance in the standard deviation of
per-attribute IvOM, indicating an equalized capacity across the attribute spectrum. The
blue bars in the middle barplot of Figure 7.2 also visualize our method consistently
outperforms StyleGAN2 (red bars) for all the attributes, in particular with more significant
improvement for the minority subgroups.
(5) Figure 7.4 shows qualitative comparisons in terms of query reconstruction and
uncurated random generation. StyleGAN2 suffers from mode collapse. For the collapsed
modes, our method significantly improves the generation from non-existence of rare
attributes to good quality (hat, sunglasses, etc.). Our method also demonstrates desirable
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Precision1k Recall1k IvOM1k
minority only minority only minority only
Arbitrary minority ⇑ ⇑ ⇓
subgroup Method Train Val Train Val Train Val
StyleGAN2 [267] 0.719 0.704 0.582 0.589 0.355 0.352
Eyeglasses Ours LPIPS interp 0.843 0.845 0.740 0.708 0.309 0.308
(6%) Ours Eyeglasses 0.904 0.919 0.897 0.892 0.261 0.288
StyleGAN2 [267] 0.707 0.750 0.461 0.424 0.301 0.305
Bald Ours LPIPS interp 0.763 0.783 0.666 0.670 0.269 0.273
(2%) Ours Bald 0.779 0.718 0.842 0.810 0.189 0.273
Narrow Eyes StyleGAN2 [267] 0.719 0.701 0.543 0.577 0.272 0.274
&Heavy Makeup Ours LPIPS interp 0.794 0.760 0.632 0.621 0.246 0.248
(4%) Ours EN&HM 0.799 0.766 0.698 0.696 0.194 0.244
Bags Under Eyes StyleGAN2 [267] 0.838 0.804 0.736 0.725 0.263 0.268
&High Cheekbones Ours LPIPS interp 0.816 0.831 0.700 0.742 0.237 0.241
&Attractive (4%) Ours BUE&HC&A 0.889 0.883 0.813 0.809 0.191 0.237
Table 7.3: Comparisons on CelebA minority subgroups, where the percentages show
their portion w.r.t. the entire population. The metrics are measured on the corresponding
subgroups only. We indicate for each metric whether a higher (⇑) or lower (⇓) value is
more desirable. We highlight the best performance in bold.
generation fidelity and diversity.
(6) All the conclusions above generalize well to unseen data, as evidenced by the
“Val” columns in Table 7.2.
7.4.5 Extension to Minority Inclusion
We adapt our method for ensuring specific coverage over minority subgroups (Algorithm 1).
Without introducing unconscious bias on the CelebA attributes, we arbitrarily specify four
sets of attributes, the samples of which count for no more than 6% of the population, and
therefore, constitute four minority subgroups respectively. The attribute sets and their
portions are listed in the first column of Table 7.3.
To validate minority inclusion, we first compare our minority model variants over
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Figure 7.5: Reconstructed samples according to different minority subgroups. The query
images for reconstruction in the bottom row of each sub-figure are real from the training
set.
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the corresponding minority subsets against the backbone StyleGAN2 and against our
general full model. See Table 7.3 for the results. Our minority variants consistently
outperform the two baselines over all the minority subgroups. In Figure 7.5, our method
reconstructs the minority attributes the most accurately, even for the subtle attributes
like eye bags where StyleGAN2 fails. It validates better training data utilization of our
minority models.
To validate the overall performance beyond minority subgroups, we show at the
bottom of Table 7.2 the performance on the entire attribute spectrum. We conclude that
the improvement of all our minority models comes at little or no compromise from their
performance on the overall dataset.
7.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we formalized the problem of minority inclusion as one of data
coverage and improved data coverage using a novel paradigm that harmonizes adversarial
training (GAN) with reconstructive generation (IMLE). Our method outperforms state-of-
the-art methods in terms of Precision, Recall, and IvOM on CelebA, and the improvement
generalizes well on unseen data. We further extended our method to ensure explicit
inclusion for minority subgroups at little or no compromise on overall full-dataset performance.
We believe this is an important step towards fairness in generative models, with the aim
to reduce and ultimately prevent discrimination due to model and data biases.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
Deep generative modeling is never a niche topic on its own. In fact, there are
many aspects that need our attention. We need to care about the generation quality, i.e.,
performance. We need to care about the control from input to output, i.e., steerability.
We need to care about the margins between real and fake, i.e., security. We also need to
care about the minority representation, i.e., inclusion. Each of them has some tradeoffs.
We not only ask what can the blessing of deep generative models do for us. We also
ask what can we do for its curse. Both questions lead to my Ph.D. research for human-
centric deep generative models. It lies on interpreting the behaviors and mitigating the
misbehaviors of generative models.
My research works are instantiated but not limited to the following topics: Contrastive
and Attentive GANs for improved generation performance, Texture Mixer for improved
texture steerability, a series of GAN Fingerprinting solutions for improved deepfake security,
as well as Inclusive GAN for improved minority inclusion. I propose to examine and
improve the human-centric properties of generative models, then project actionable insights
to their applications, and finally contribute to human-generator interaction.
When we look back and forward the roadmap of human-generator interaction, we
see three clear stages. (1) The first stage is human-driven generation. Artists use
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brushes or software to describe our world and imagination with pixels. They provide
realistic or artistic representation ground truth for generators to mimic. (2) The second
stage is super-human generation. With unlimited computation power, generators can
automatically recreate visual world with their own imagination. Sometimes they can
assist artists for more efficient production. In many other cases they can even outperform
what humans can make or go beyond what humans can think of. (3) Guess what will
the third stage be? Generators are going to conquer and dominate human beings? I hope
not. I hope the third stage would be human-centric generation. I would have a long-
term passion for calibrating deep generative models to be human-centric. I hope to turn
generators from enemies to partners and peers, so as to augment humans’ life through
auto-generation. I also hope to synergize machine intelligence with human intelligence.
It is acknowledged that human is good at high-level reasoning while machine is good
at computation. I am looking for the best of the two worlds and build more beneficial
applications with human-generator interaction.
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adversarial networks. In ICML.
[66] Ishaan Gulrajani, Faruk Ahmed, Martin Arjovsky, Vincent Dumoulin, and Aaron
Courville. Improved training of wasserstein gans. In NeurIPS, 2017.
[67] Ting Chen, Mario Lucic, Neil Houlsby, and Sylvain Gelly. On self modulation for
generative adversarial networks. In ICLR, 2019.
[68] Alexia Jolicoeur-Martineau. The relativistic discriminator: a key element missing
from standard gan. In ICLR, 2019.
[69] Minguk Kang and Jaesik Park. Contragan: Contrastive learning for conditional
image generation. In NeurIPS, 2020.
[70] Zhengli Zhao, Zizhao Zhang, Ting Chen, Sameer Singh, and Han Zhang. Image
augmentations for gan training. In arXiv, 2020.
[71] Jongheon Jeong and Jinwoo Shin. Training GANs with stronger augmentations via
contrastive discriminator. In ICLR, 2021.
[72] Ning Yu, Connelly Barnes, Eli Shechtman, Sohrab Amirghodsi, and Michal Lukác.
Texture mixer: A network for controllable synthesis and interpolation of texture.
In CVPR, 2019.
158
[73] Ning Yu, Larry S Davis, and Mario Fritz. Attributing fake images to gans: Learning
and analyzing gan fingerprints. In ICCV, 2019.
[74] Ricard Durall, Margret Keuper, and Janis Keuper. Watch your up-convolution:
Cnn based generative deep neural networks are failing to reproduce spectral
distributions. In CVPR, 2020.
[75] Ting Chen, Xiaohua Zhai, Marvin Ritter, Mario Lucic, and Neil Houlsby. Self-
supervised gans via auxiliary rotation loss. In CVPR, 2019.
[76] Chieh Hubert Lin, Chia-Che Chang, Yu-Sheng Chen, Da-Cheng Juan, Wei
Wei, and Hwann-Tzong Chen. Coco-gan: generation by parts via conditional
coordinating. In ICCV, 2019.
[77] Aaron van den Oord, Yazhe Li, and Oriol Vinyals. Representation learning with
contrastive predictive coding. arXiv, 2018.
[78] Ting Chen, Simon Kornblith, Mohammad Norouzi, and Geoffrey Hinton. A simple
framework for contrastive learning of visual representations. In ICML, 2020.
[79] Xu Jia, Bert De Brabandere, Tinne Tuytelaars, and Luc V Gool. Dynamic filter
networks. In NeurIPS, 2016.
[80] Bichen Wu, Chenfeng Xu, Xiaoliang Dai, Alvin Wan, Peizhao Zhang, Masayoshi
Tomizuka, Kurt Keutzer, and Peter Vajda. Visual transformers: Token-based image
representation and processing for computer vision. In arXiv, 2020.
[81] Xiaolong Wang, Ross Girshick, Abhinav Gupta, and Kaiming He. Non-local neural
networks. In CVPR, 2018.
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